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ABSTRACT 
Since 9/11, the Transportation Security Administration  (TSA) has struggled to 
maintain a balance between providing a secure world-class aviation passenger-
screening program (APSP) while providing efficiency, convenience and security 
for the traveling public and the airline industry. For years the TSA has applied 
resources and procedures uniformly to all passengers during aviation passenger 
screening. It is mainly a “one size fits all “ screening where all passengers are 
treated as equal risk, which has exponentially increased resources, procedures 
and equipment required to do aviation passenger screening, 
Recently, the Transportation Security Administration has sought to find a 
better way to conduct aviation passenger screening and is transitioning to Risk 
Based Security (RBS). The RBS initiatives have greatly improved the aviation 
passenger screening experience while increasing the efficiency of checkpoint 
screening by shortening the amount of wait times. Furthermore, it has allowed 
resources to be applied to high-risk individuals and lessen the burden of 
passenger screening on low-risk individuals. This has freed up resources 
reduced procedures while simultaneously increasing the efficiency of the 
checkpoint. 
The research here provides options on how to better enable current RBS 
initiatives by incorporating biometric technology into the aviation passenger-
screening program. This research has reviewed other government programs that 
have incorporated biometrics into their procedures to improve the efficiency and 
reliability by using biometrically enhanced security measures. Through the 
application or modification of these biometrically enhanced security programs of 
other agencies, the TSA could standardize and incorporate biometrics into the 
RBS APSP allowing for authentication of both identity verification and 
identification. This research will explore how to incorporate biometrics into the 
current Risk-Based Security Aviation Passenger Screening Program. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“We do use a one-size-fits-all approach, which I don’t think is either 
efficient or beneficial for the traveling public or for security.” 
TSA Administrator Pistole, Congressional Testimony, 10 February 2011 
A. BACKGROUND  
In November 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act (ATSA) of 2001. This was the essential legislation that created the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). It was perhaps best known for 
“federalizing” airport security by creating a large federal workforce of passenger 
and baggage screeners to replace the private contract screeners previously 
employed by airlines, to staff passenger screening checkpoints at airport 
concourses. (Poole, 2006, p.1) Since the federalization of passenger screening, 
every day in the United States, approximately 2 million air travelers travel 
throughout the country and are subjected to a “one-size-fits-all” screening 
system. The TSA’s Aviation Passenger Screening Program (APSP) process uses 
massive amounts of federal resources, creates frustration amongst the traveling 
public with long lines and wait times, impacts the airline industry and U.S. 
economy, and is not the most effective or efficient way to conduct passenger 
screening. The aviation passenger-screening program mainly applies an “equal 
risk” model to all passengers and does not differentiate between suspected 
terrorists or the 1 million-mile frequent flier business traveler. In the summer of 
2011,TSA Administrator John Pistole introduced Risk-Based Security (RBS) to 
the TSA. The Risk-Based Security model uses information gained during pre-
screening, along with thorough observation and interaction with passengers to 
determine the proper level of screening that matches the passenger’s risk 
assessment. The RBS model will allow the TSA to re-focus some resources on 
higher risk or unknown risk travelers thereby increasing security efficiency and  
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effectiveness. (Transportation Security Administration n.d., p. 6) There is an even 
better way to improve the new Risk-Based Security aviation passenger-screening 
program. 
The current passenger-screening program method has not fully adopted 
the National Security Presidential Directives and Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives (HSPD-59/HSPD24). The HSPDs call for the use of biometrics for 
identification and screening to enhance national security. (The White House, 
2008, p1.) Congressional reports show the TSA and other governmental 
agencies have failed to adopt fully effective strategies, policies and technology 
that meet the HSPDs, while at the same time ignore longstanding Congressional 
statues to establish biometric credentialing standards for passenger screening 
(U.S. House of Representatives n.d., p.4). 
In a recent Congressional Testimony, TSA Administrator, John Pistole 
stated, “The vast majority of 628 million annual air travelers present little to no 
risk of committing an act of terrorism, we should focus on those who present the 
greatest risk, thereby improving security and the travel experience for everyone 
else.” (Transportation Security Administration, 2011) It was found that passenger 
revenue (nearly 80%) comes from domestic travel. It was also found that a 
relatively small group of travelers (frequent flyers who take more than 10 trips a 
year) account for a significant amount of travel. While this small group of flyers 
represent only 8% of the total number of passengers flying in a given year, they 
make up almost 40% of trips taken (www.avjobs.com/history/airline-
economics.asp, 2012). This explains how the majority of the traveling public are 
trustworthy travelers who pose little or no threat to the current aviation enterprise 
in the United States. Using a technology enhanced risk-based passenger-
screening program that validates the identification of known trustworthy 
passengers and processes them in a more expeditious manner will improve the 
current RBS aviation security passenger-screening program. Additionally, 
trustworthy passengers under the RBS aviation passenger-screening program 
will be subject to less scrutiny of inspection than high risk and unknown traveling 
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passengers. Incorporating biometric technology that validates an individual’s 
identification will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the screening 
system. At the same time, the RBS model will reduce required federal resources, 
lessen the frustration of current passenger travel experience and be financially 
advantageous to both the airline industry and the U.S. economy. There are many 
benefits to incorporating and leveraging current biometric technologies into the 
TSA’s current Risk-Based Screening aviation passenger screening program. 
Since September 11, 2001, the commercial passenger screening process 
has been drastically transformed into a rigid methodical one-size-fits-all 
passenger-screening security program. The system applies an “equal risk” model 
to all passengers and does not differentiate between suspected terrorists or the 
1M-mile frequent flier. The TSA struggles to strike a balance between effectively 
screening passengers and avoiding undue delays and hassles to the traveling 
public while trying to prepare for the next attack on the system. The current 
strategy for the passenger-screening approach at federalized airports is a “one-
size-fits-all” screening approach for all passengers, which is woefully ineffective. 
The Transportation Security Administration “inspects everyone and everything” 
the same way no matter their status, stature, race, age or creed. The strategy for 
passenger screening is each traveler is treated equally as a threat so all are 
scrutinized and screened the same way. Each individual goes through the same 
regimen of a “one-size-fits-all” passenger-screening program. This program has 
been an extremely successful strategy, but is not beneficial to the traveling 
public, governmental budgets or U.S. economy because of its inefficiencies. 
Every day in the United States, approximately 2 million air travelers travel 
throughout the country and are subjected to a one-size-fits-all screening system. 
This passenger screening process uses massive amounts of resources, creates 
frustration amongst the traveling public, and is not an effective or efficient way to 
conduct passenger screening. The aviation passenger-screening program has 
been successful, but it is costly and inefficient for the traveling public. The TSA 
annually spends about $7 billion and has a workforce numbering an estimated 
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60,000. One reason for the workforce and expense being so large is that 
screening functions are imposed virtually uniformly on every traveler and airport 
in the United States (Riley, 2004, p.24). The TSA is continually adding to the 
number of new passenger screening security procedures at each checkpoint, 
which contributes to large annual increases in the TSA’s budget. For example, 
from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2010, the TSA’s annual budget 
increased by almost 70% from $4.5 billion to $7.6 billion while airline loads are 
stable (U.S. Travel Association, n.d. p.8). 
In recent surveys it was found the American traveling public travels less 
because of the frustration they feel when having to deal with the current aviation 
passenger-screening processes. A majority of the individuals surveyed stated 
they would take more flights every year if the screening process remained as 
effective as it was but was less intrusive and less time-consuming. In 2008, a 
survey found the hassles of air travel were discouraging people from flying. More 
than 28% of the respondents said that they choose to avoid one trip a year. A 
simple extrapolation of these results indicated that 41 million travelers, or slightly 
more than 100,000 per day avoid trips during the year. That loss of travel 
translates into a $26.5 billion loss to the U.S. economy; including $9.4 billion to 
airlines, $5.6 billion to hotels, $3.1 billion to restaurants, and $4.2 billion in 
federal, state and local tax revenues. A similar 2010 survey found that 64% of 
travelers surveyed stated, that on average they would take two to three more 
trips a year if the hassle could be reduced without compromising security 
effectiveness. These additional trips could add an estimated $84.6 billion in 
spending and possibly almost 900,000 jobs to our economy (U.S. Travel 
Association, n.d., pp. 6–7). 
TSA administrator, John Pistole, believed the former passenger screening 
security model was inefficient (Yager, 2011). There is a better way to conduct 
passenger screening that is more effective and efficient, as well as being 
customer friendly while meeting the needs of the traveling public. In the fall of 
2011, the introduction of the TSA’s new Risked Based Security (RBS) has rapidly 
 5 
introduced new passenger-screening programs to compliment the current 
aviation passenger-screening program.  
B. CASE FOR UTILIZING BIOMETRICS IN PASSENGER SCREENING 
1. Resources 
Incorporating biometric technology into the current RBS aviation 
passenger screening program could lessen the amount of resources required for 
aviation screening or reprioritize current aviation screening resources to higher 
risk or threat passengers. Today, the TSA is introducing a risk-based screening 
initiative, but still utilizes a “one-size-fits-all” approach for the majority of 
passenger screening. Additionally, the TSA is continually adding to the number of 
new passenger screening security procedures at each checkpoint, which 
contributes to large annual increases in the TSA’s budget. For example, from 
fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2010, the TSA’s annual budget increased by 
almost 70% from $4.5 billion to $7.6 billion. (U.S. Travel Association n.d. p.8)  
Figure 1.   TSA Budget compared to domestic passenger levels from U.S. 
Travel, n.d. 
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By lessening this aviation passenger-screening burden created by the 
one-size-fits-all, each passenger is treated the same, so low risk passengers 
receive the same screening rigor as high and unknown risk passengers. The 
current resources, both personnel and equipment, are uniformly distributed 
across aviation screening checkpoints but could be refocused and re-prioritized 
toward the unknown and high risk or threat passengers. Many efficiencies can be 
gained by incorporating biometric technology and the RBS screening system for 
all airports; less equipment would be required; fewer Transportation Security 
Officers (TSO) would be required, which would lead to a budgetary savings by 
gaining efficiencies and effectiveness through technology and risk management. 
Figure 2.   FTE vs. Domestic Air travel from U.S. House of Representatives, 
2012 
2. Statutory Requirement 
Another reason for incorporating biometric technology into the current 
aviation passenger-screening program is both Congress and the President 
enacted statutory and directive requirements to incorporate biometric technology 
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into the airport screening processes. Congress included statutory language in the 
2001 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L.107–71) and also in 
the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110–161) directing the 
TSA to establish a domestic and international “trusted traveler” program that 
incorporates biometrics technologies (Elias, 2009, pp. 20–22). In June 2008, the 
White House published NSPD-59 and HSPD-24, which requires biometrics for 
identification and screening to enhance national security. The directive provides 
a federal framework for applying existing and emerging biometric technologies to 
the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of data identification to improve 
screening process and procedures employed by agencies and to enhance 
national security (The White House 2008, p.1). Additionally, in a recent 
congressional majority staff report, Congress recommended the TSA must 
develop an expedited screening program using biometric credentials that would 
allow the TSA to positively identify trusted passengers and crew members so that 
the agency could prioritize its screening resources on unknown and high risk 
passengers and select individuals. The TSA will not be able to function as a truly 
risk-based organization until the agency can differentiate between passengers 
based on risks (U.S. House of Representatives n.d. pp.13 and 20). 
3. Economics  
A final purpose for incorporating biometric technology into the aviation 
passenger-screening program is that it could add economic growth to the travel 
and airline industry while potentially producing more jobs in United States. In 
recent surveys it was found the American traveling public travels less because of 
the frustration they feel when having to deal with the current aviation passenger 
screening process. A majority of the individuals surveyed stated they would take 
more flights every year if the screening process remained as effective as it was 
but was less intrusive and less time-consuming. In 2008, a survey found the 
hassles of air travel were discouraging people from flying. More than 28% of the 
respondents said they choose to avoid one trip a year. A simple extrapolation of 
these results indicated that 41 million travelers, or slightly more than 100,000 per 
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day avoid trips during the year. These additional trips could add $84.6 billion in 
spending and possibly almost 900,000 jobs to our economy (U.S. Travel 
Association n.d. pp. 6–7). The FAA predicts that yearly passenger totals will grow 
from approximately 713 million domestic and international passengers in FY 
2010 to 731 million in FY 2011. In the next five years alone, FAA predicts that 
passenger levels will grow by an average of 3.7 percent per year, and continue to 
grow at an average of 2.5 percent from FY 2016 to FY 2032. Passengers are 
projected to increase an average of 2.5 percent a year, with regional carriers 
growing at a slightly higher rate than their mainline counterparts. By 2032, U.S. 
commercial air carriers are projected to fly 1.9 trillion ASMs (Available Seat 
Miles) and transport 1.23 billion enplaned passengers a total of 1.57 trillion 
passenger miles (FAA, 2012, p.38). With such steep rises in passenger levels, 
TSA will be hard pressed to control the growth of its budget; wait times at 
security checkpoints will increase, and the burdens of the current system will 
slow economic recovery unless Congress and TSA develop a long-term, risk 
based strategy to focus assets and resources at the highest priority threats (U.S. 








Figure 3.   FAA’s Forecast of Enplanements from 2011–2032 from FAA, 2012 
C. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The current aviation passenger-screening program utilizes a 72-hour pre-
screening process, called Secure Flight along with observation and interaction of 
traveling passengers called Screening of Passengers by Observation 
Techniques (SPOT) conducted by Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) to 
determine the level of scrutiny they will go through the screening process when 
arriving at the airport. These traveling passengers may be put into a low risk, 
unknown risk, or high-risk category based on the afore mentioned formula. Those 
in the low risk category will receive fewer screening procedures and are 
considered “trusted travelers” whereas the other passengers will be considered 
for more scrutiny in the screening process. The new RBS initiative utilizes 
intelligence-driven screening processes and individual observation to determine 
the proper level of screening that matches the passenger’s risk assessment. 
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Remarkably, the current aviation passenger-screening program does not 
utilize or integrate biometric technology to validate a person’s identity during the 
screening process. During the aviation passenger-screening process, a 
passenger’s identification documentation itself is authenticated, but this does not 
guarantee the true identity of the passenger. A passenger’s identification 
documentation is authenticated but their identity is not validated. The increased 
sophistication of document forgery is making it more difficult to guarantee the 
genuineness of a passenger’s travel documentation. The true identity of a 
passenger has always remained in question. A much more reliable and efficient 
way to validate a person’s identity is through biometrics. Incorporating biometrics 
could greatly enhance effectiveness and provide greater reasonable assurance 
of the passenger’s true identity especially in low risk traveling public populations. 
It is important to investigate how to improve the Risk-Based Security 
initiatives for APSP procedures for the United States. Other agencies, both 
private and governmental, are incorporating biometric technologies to improve, 
enhance, and leverage technology to improve the efficiency, reliability, and 
effectiveness of security models. Further investigation merits graduate-level 
research to examine how biometric technologies can be utilized to improve the 
current RBS aviation passenger-screening procedures. There may be a “better 
way of screening “ model that can validate an individual’s identity and not just 
prove the authenticity of their identification documentation. This research can 
contribute to a better aviation passenger-screening program by complementing 
the current RBS initiatives while demonstrating better screening procedures 
utilizing biometrics to gain synergy for the Risk-Based Security aviation 
passenger-screening procedures. 
Incorporating biometrics into the Risk-Based Security aviation passenger- 
screening program could improve the current passenger screening system by 
making it more effective and efficient, customer friendly as well as economically 
feasible for commercial aviation in meeting both the needs of the traveling public 
and requirements of the regulatory statutes. The new TSA Risk-Based Security 
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aviation passenger-screening program for the United States federalized airports 
plays an important role in the transportation security sector of the aviation 
security domain.  
The decade-old aviation security passenger-screening method of the 
“one-size-fits-all” passenger-screening program is changing to a novel Risk-
Based Screening program in an attempt to improve efficiency and effectiveness 
of passenger screening. There is a better way to leverage biometric technology 
to improve the RBS aviation passenger-screening program’s efficiency and 
effectiveness in regard to the identity of the travelling public. Its public 
acceptability and customer friendliness that is economically sensible, decreases 
resources required while improving risk mitigation and meeting statutory 
compliance. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION  
1. Primary Research Question: 
How could biometric technologies enhance the current Risk-Based 
Security (RBS) aviation passenger-screening program for the federalized airports 
in the United States to improve passenger identity authentication?   
2. Secondary Research Questions: 
How are current aviation passenger-screening program procedures being 
adapted to enable risk-based security initiatives?  
What biometric technologies currently used by other governmental 
agencies can be incorporated to improve passenger identity authentication? 
How could TSA integrate biometric technologies into the risk based 
screening programs and the current aviation passenger-screening program? 
E. SUMMARY 
It is important to investigate how to improve the Risk-Based Security 
aviation passenger-screening program for the United States. Other agencies, 
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both private and governmental, are incorporating biometric technologies to 
improve, enhance, and leverage technology to improve the efficiency, reliability, 
and effectiveness of security models. I believe further investigation merits 
graduate-level research to show how biometric technologies can be utilized to 
improve the current RBS aviation passenger-screening program.  
The TSA will continue to address the tension between sensibly screening 
passengers and crewmembers while avoiding undue delays to the traveling 
public, minimizing economic impact on the airline industry and the U.S. economy, 
being compliant with statutory legislation and directives while being publicly and 
socially acceptable. The current aviation security passenger-screening program 
has been a program of “one size fits all” since the tragic events of 9/11. This 
program has been woefully inefficient and has impacted the way United States 
citizens travel, which has caused an impact on the economy of the United States.   
During the aviation passenger-screening process, a passenger’s 
identification documentation is authenticated but their identity is not validated. 
Incorporating biometrics will greatly improve efficiency and effectiveness while 
providing a greater reasonable assurance of the passenger’s identity especially 
in the low risk traveling public population. The TSA must develop an expedited 
aviation passenger-screening program using advanced biometric technology that 
allows the TSA to positively identify low risk “trusted” passengers and 
crewmembers so the agency can prioritize it’s screening resources on individuals 
of high risk while speeding up the screening process (Peterman, Elias and 
Frittelli 2011 p.65). Biometrics technology will lead to a better way. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this review is to examine the current RBS passenger-
screening program, review current biometric technology and highlight current 
incorporation of biometrics into RBS initiative programs.   The scope of the 
literature review examines three broad categories 1.)  Risk Based Security 
Initiative 2.) Current Biometric Technology 3.) Governmental and Non-
Governmental biometrically enhanced security programs. The sources of the 
literature review include government and non-government information from: 
online articles, policy documents, scholarly journal articles, Congressional 
research papers, white papers, Congressional testimony, and academic research 
including interview with leading policy makers in the biometrics. The literature 
examined has been within the past ten years and the most recent articles dated 
May 2012. The purpose of this literature review is to review issues and programs 
that could enhance the current RBS passenger-screening model and are relevant 
to making our aviation passenger security screening system more effective and 
efficient. 
B. RISK BASED SECURITY 
Since September 11, 2001, changes have been made to aviation security 
in an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks. Additional screening processes 
have been put in place and new technologies have been deployed. This is 
reflected in the budgets for the aviation elements of the TSA. As these changes 
have occurred, however, questions have been raised about a basic philosophy of 
aviation security applied uniformly to all. This argument has been “crystallized” in 
the public debate with images of grandmothers getting the same treatment as 
people who are more likely to be terrorists. One outcome of this debate has been 
renewed interest in ways to vary the amount of screening individuals receive with 
the goals of improving performance and reducing the security burden on (some) 
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travelers. Preferential treatment in screening can be approached in two ways. 
The first is identifying individuals who may pose more risk than others and 
allocating more security resources to them, a process usually called profiling. 
The second is identifying individuals who likely pose less risk than others and 
allowing them to pass through security with reduced security screening, a 
process known as trusted traveler programs (Jackson, Chan, LaTourrette, 2011, 
pp. 1–2). 
There is extensive literature examining the profiling, but there is much less 
analysis of the trusted traveler programs. Creating a new Trusted Traveler (TT) 
program that utilizes true risk-management requires a controlled enrollment and 
re-verification process; a confirmation process at the airport that ensures only 
enrolled individuals are utilizing the TT screening lanes and a checkpoint process 
that reflects the low-risk nature of the traveler (U.S. Travel Association, n.d. p. 
12). The basic logic of a trusted traveler program is that security resources can 
be shifted from travelers who have been confirmed as low risk to the remaining 
unknown-risk population. It is assumed that devoting more security resources to 
the unknown-risk population would increase the chance of identifying individuals 
seeking to bring weapons through security checkpoints to stage attacks on 
aircraft (Jackson, Chan, LaTourrette, 2011, pp. 1–2). The trusted traveler 
programs apply the same logic applied to TSA employees. At many airports, TSA 
employees are screened neither the first time nor subsequent times when they 
enter the secure sterile area of an airport throughout the course of the day 
because they have had a background check and are trusted. The TSA 
employees are thought to be practically low risk for coercion or vulnerable to 
radical influence to which passengers are thought to be vulnerable. Additionally, 
at many other airports, background checked employees (airport shops, airport 
police, airport kiosk volunteers) are considered low risk and have unibiometric all-
access badges that allow them to bypass screening security and enter into the 
sterile secure area (Riley, 2011, pp. 4–5). This has been the precedent for many 
years and there have been no terrorist incidents associated with this model 
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indicating a passenger trusted traveler program could be successful utilizing a 
similar methodology. 
 In a recent RAND Corporation report “Assessing the Security Benefits of 
a Trusted Traveler Program…” found that the key elements needed for a trusted 
traveler program are: 
 
• A member of the traveling public applies for the program, so the 
program is voluntary and may involve an application fee. 
• A tightly controlled background-check process verifies that the 
individual meets the criteria for trusted status. 
• A separate, reduced security-screening process is applied to 
trusted travelers when they access air transportation, thus reducing 
resources needed for screening (Jackson, Chan, LaTourrette, 
2011, pp.1–2). 
 
The reduction in screening undergone by a trusted traveler would free up 
resources that could be applied to members of the general public. If screening 
resources are treated as a constant, all resources could be removed or fewer 
resources could be used from the “trusted traveler lines” and would be 
redeployed to “general public lines,” affording, for example, more time to 
scrutinize x-ray images of their belongings or manually search their bags, more 
resources to deploy and routinely use explosive detection technologies that are 
more effective than current methods. In order to have a trusted traveler program 
with all resources being constant, risk-based security must be weighed heavily 
for the aviation passenger-screening program (Jackson, Chan, LaTourrette, 
2011, pp.1–2). 
In the fall of 2010 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
Administrator John Pistole directed the agency to explore ways to develop a 
strategy for a “Trusted Traveler” program. The new strategy formulation needed 
to examine the procedures and technologies TSA used, how specific security 
procedures were carried out, and how screening was conducted. The exploration 
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resulted in the novel Risked Based Security initiatives. While TSA is currently 
implementing new risk-based security initiatives, TSA must continue to assess its 
programs to evolve the passenger screening security model to stay ahead of 
tomorrow’s security threats (Transportation Security Administration, n.d.). 
In 2011, TSA Administrator Pistole introduced Risk-Based Security (RBS) 
initiatives to the TSA and the general public. To this end, the TSA is examining 
new security protocols to improve the passenger screening models at selected 
airports throughout the United States by applying a new risk-based security pilot 
program. Some of the guiding principles of Risk Based Screening initiatives are:  
 
• The majority of airline passengers are low risk. 
• By having passengers voluntarily provide more information about 
them, TSA can better segment the population in terms of risk.  
• TSA must accelerate its efforts to optimize screening processes 
and use of technology to gain system-wide efficiencies.  
• TSA must better calibrate operational responses and procedures to 
specific threat information.  
• The RBS pilot program efforts will enhance security of the nation’s 
aviation system (Transportation Security Administration, 2011). 
 
In general, RBS initiatives use information gained during pre-screening, 
along with a thorough observation and interaction with passengers to determine 
the proper level of screening that matches the passenger’s risk assessment. 
Risk-Based Security allows the TSA to re-focus resources on higher risk or 
unknown risk travelers thereby increasing security (Transportation Security 
Administration, n.d.). In Risk-Based Security, the TSA takes into account the 
possible threat, vulnerability, and potential consequences of all associated airline 
and travel industry passengers and employees. The TSA applies these risk-
based methodologies in order to depart from the “inspect everyone and 
everything” and the “one-size-fits-all” approaches to screening (Riley, 2011, p. 
153). Using these risk-based methodologies, the TSA improves checkpoint 
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efficiency while decreasing passenger wait times and providing cost savings to 
the U.S. taxpayer. In a similar program, CBP’s Global Entry Program, allows low-
risk pre-approved travelers expedited access into the U.S. utilizing biometric 
Global Entry kiosks at airports rather than having travelers wait in line for border 
and customs clearance. As of mid-2012, there were Global Entry kiosks at 25 
major airports that had been used over 2.6 million times reducing the traveler 
wait times by 70% and saving CBP officers over 50,000 inspection hours 
allowing them to focus resources on individuals of unknown or high risk status 
(Zuckerman, 2012). The TSA RBS initiative is based on the premise that the 
majority of airline passengers are low-risk and TSA knows who they are. The 
more information available on each traveler, the better his/her risk category can 
be determined. Incorporating risk-based initiatives with technology can optimize 
the screening process and efficiency can be gained through risk mitigation while 
increasing security by focusing on the unknowns (Transportation Security 
Administration, 2012). In fast-tracking passenger screening processes, the RBS 
initiatives that are expediting passenger screening benefits for qualified “trusted 
travelers” include no longer removing: 1.) Shoes 2.) 3–1–1 compliant1 bags from 
carry on 3.) Laptops from bags 4.) Light jackets and over garments and 5.) Belts 
(Transportation Security Administration, 2012).  
                                            
1 3-1-1 compliant is 3.4 ounce (100ml) bottle or less (by volume); 1 quart-sized, clear, plastic, zip-
top bag; 1 bag per passenger placed in screening bin. One-quart bag per person limits the total 





Figure 4.   TSA 3–1–1 Policy from TSA, 2012 
C. TSA RISK BASED INITIATIVES 
The TSA Administrator, John S. Pistole has taken major steps required to 
incorporate risk-based security initiative passenger screening. In his testimony in 
June 2011, he testified to Congress: 
We [TSA] are working to expand our ability to conduct more risk 
and identity-based screening. This is evident in our work on a new 
crewmember screening system. We are currently testing an 
identity-based system to enable TSA security officers to positively 
verify the identity and employment status of airline pilots. We hope 
pilots are responsible for the safety of the traveling public every 
time they fly a plane. It just makes sense to treat them as trusted 
partners, as well (Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 
John S. Pistole, Administrator TSA 
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Figure 5.   Risk Based Security Initiatives from TSA, 2012 
The Risk-Based Security Initiatives passenger-screening model has 
introduced new expediting screening programs, which are: 1. Pre-Check (TSA 
Pre✓™) - Expedited Screening 2.) Screening for Passengers 12 and Under 3.) 
Screening for Passengers 75 and Older 4.) Screening for Department of Defense 
Common Access Card (DoD CAC) U.S. Service Members 5.) Known Crew 
Member (KCM). (Transportation Security Administration, 2012) 
1. Pre-Check (TSA Pre✓™) Expedited Screening:  
TSA Pre✓™ involves screening select frequent fliers as well as, members 
of Customs and Border Protection and various trusted traveler programs. The 
Pre✓™ travelers voluntarily sign up for this program, go through a thorough 
background check and provide photo identification. This makes the trusted 
travelers eligible to go to a separate screening lane and receive expedited 
 20 
passenger screening benefits.2  TSA Pre✓™ enhances aviation security by 
placing more focus on pre-screening individuals who volunteer to participate in 
order to expedite the travel experience and passenger screening process 
(Transportation Security Administration, 2012).   
2. Screening for Passengers 12 and Under:  
Passengers 12 and under are allowed to leave their shoes on during 
screening. They are permitted multiple passes through the walk-through metal 
detector (WTMD) and advanced imaging technology (AIT/ATR). They are 
subjected to a greater use of explosives trace detection (ETD) technology to 
clear any alarms in lieu of being subjected to a pat down. These new procedures 
ensure effective security and allow TSA to focus its resources on individuals the 
agency knows less about while improving travel experiences for younger 
travelers (Transportation Security Administration, 2012). 
3. Screening for Passengers 75 and Older:  
Passengers 75 and older are also allowed to leave their shoes on during 
screening, as well as, multiple passes through the WTMD or AIT/ATR and 
utilized the ETD to clear any alarms. The new processes for passengers 75 and 
older ultimately reduce – but not eliminate – pat-downs that would have 
otherwise been conducted to resolve anomalies. If anomalies are detected during 
security screening that cannot be resolved through other procedures, it is 
possible they may be subject to a modified pat down. Again, this is another 
example of utilizing finite resources on passengers who may be more likely to 
pose a risk to transportation while expediting the passenger screening process. 
4. Department of Defense Common Access Card (DoD CAC):   
The members of the U.S. Armed Forces are entrusted to protect the 
security and values of citizens with their lives and as such, these members pose 
                                            
2 TSA Pre✓™ participants use dedicated screening lanes for screening benefits which include 
leaving on shoes, light outerwear and belts, as well as leaving laptops and 3-1-1 compliant liquids 
in carry-on bags. 
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very little risk to aviation security and are considered “trusted travelers.” Eligible 
service members include U.S. Armed Forces service members including 
Reservist and National Guard members, who possess a valid Department of 
Defense Common Access Card (DoD CAC). Service members in good standing 
with the Department of Defense (DoD) will receive expedited screening benefits 
and will be directed to the TSA Pre✓™ expedited screening lane after their status 
has been verified. Again, this will also expedite the passenger screening process 
(Transportation Security Administration, 2012). 
5. Known Crewmember (KCM):  
KCM incorporates airline pilots as “trusted partners” in the aviation 
security strategy. This program allows identity confirmed airline pilots to bypass 
passenger-screening procedures and proceed to the gate and their aircraft 
duties. Currently the crewmembers enter a screening checkpoint and provide 
their airline ID, which is matched against a database called Cockpit Access 
Security System (CASS). If the pilot’s picture ID matches the CASS picture, the 
pilot is granted access to the secured gate areas without being screened. This is 
very similar to TSA employees not being screened when they enter the secure 
gate area of an airport throughout the course of the day, because they are 
“trusted employees” who have passed a thorough government background 
check, provided a biometric fingerprint with high resolution digital photo, and are 
thought to have a particularly low risk threat to aviation security. In addition to the 
TSA employees, numerous other airport employees, who have undergone the 
same scrutiny as the TSA employees, such as airport police department 
personnel, enter the secure area of the airport without going through screening 
procedures (Riley, 2011, pp. 153–154). This methodology is being applied to the 
KCM program to relieve the volume burden upon security checkpoints and 




6. Expanded Behavior Detection:   
Expanded Behavior Detection builds on the existing Screening of 
Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, which has grown 
since 2003 to include over 160 airports. Under the Expanded Behavior Detection 
pilot program, TSOs employ specialized behavioral analysis techniques to 
determine if a traveler should be referred for additional screening at the 
checkpoint. The vast majority of passengers at the pilot airport checkpoints 
experience a “casual greeting” conversation with a Behavior Detection Officer 
(BDO) as they pass through travel document verification. This additional 
interaction, used by security agencies worldwide, enables officers to better verify 
or dispel concerns about suspicious behavior and anomalies (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2012).  
7. Passenger Screening Canines: 
This is part of RBS that provides support for the development, training, 
certification and deployment of canine programs. Each canine team consists of a 
specially trained dog and a Federal, State, or local handler. This program, in 
partnership with State and local law enforcement agencies, provides a mobile 
response platform for threats to transportation security, including threats within 
the mass-transit commuter-rail, and maritime-ferry transportation sectors. This 
has now been expanded to airports where these canine teams will have 
presence and assist with the passenger-screening process (www.tsa.gov). 
8. Honor Flights:  
TSA implemented new procedures for passengers on Honor Flight 
Network flights. The new procedures greatly reduce screening procedures 
conducted on participating WWII veterans and their escorts. These screening 
procedures reduce but do not eliminate, screening requirements on Honor Flight 
Network flights (www.tsa.gov). 
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9. Secure Flight:  
Secure Flight is a behind-the-scenes program that enhances the security 
of domestic and international commercial air travel through the use of improved 
watch list matching. By collecting additional passenger data, it improves the 
travel experience for all airline passengers, including those who have been 
misidentified in the past. When passengers travel, they are required to provide 
the following Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) to the airline: name, date of 
birth, gender and redress number (if applicable). The airline then submits this 
information to Secure Flight, which uses it to perform watch list matching. This 
serves to prevent individuals on the NO Fly List from boarding an aircraft and to 
identify individuals on the Selectee List for enhanced screening. After matching 
passenger information against government watch lists, Secure Flight transmits 
the matching results back to airlines so they can issue passenger boarding 
passes (www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program).  
 
Figure 6.   Secure Flight Program Overview from TSA, 2012 
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D. BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY  
From the Merriam-Webster dictionary: “biometrics is the measurement 
and analysis of unique physical or behavioral characteristics (as fingerprint or 
voice patterns) especially as a means of verifying personal identity.”  The 
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Sub Committee on Biometrics 
provides the origins of biometrics; the term “biometrics” is derived from the Greek 
words “bio” (life) and “metrics” (to measure). Automated biometric systems have 
only become available over the last few decades, due to significant advances in 
the field of computer processing. Many of these new automated techniques, 
however, are based on ideas that were originally conceived hundreds, even 
thousands of years ago (National Science and Technology Council, 2008, p.55). 
One of the oldest and most basic examples of a characteristic that is used 
for recognition by humans is the face. Since the beginning of civilization, humans 
have used faces to identify known (familiar) and unknown (unfamiliar) individuals. 
This simple task became increasingly more challenging as populations increased 
and as more convenient methods of travel introduced many new individuals into 
once small communities. The concept of human-to-human recognition is also 
seen in behavioral-predominant biometrics such as speaker and gait recognition. 
Individuals use these characteristics, somewhat unconsciously, to recognize 
known individuals on a day-to-day basis (National Science and Technology 
Council, 2008, p.56). 
Biometrics is a tool for the automated recognition of individuals based on 
their behavioral and biological characteristics. It is a tool for establishing 
confidence that one is dealing with individuals who are already known (or not 
known)—and consequently that they belong to a group with certain rights (or to a 
group denied certain privileges).   It relies on the presumption that individuals are 
physically and behaviorally distinctive in a number of ways.   
Biometric systems are used increasingly to recognize individuals and 
regulate access to physical spaces, information, service, and to other rights or 
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benefits, including the ability to cross international borders. The motivations for 
using biometrics are diverse and often overlap. They include improving the 
convenience and efficiency of routine access transactions, reducing fraud and 
enhancing public safety and national security (National Research Council of the 
National Academies, 2010, p1). 
Biometrics is a general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic 
or a process. As a characteristic, biometrics is a measurable biological and 
behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition. A few of the 
current biological characteristics, commonly referred to as modalities, used to 
identify people are fingerprints, iris images, facial photos certain types of voice 
patterns, palm prints, and DNA. Behavioral characteristics / modalities can be a 
signature, the keystroke pattern on a keyboard, certain types of voice patterns, 
and gait (Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL, 2011, p.45). The most 
common biometric modalities are: face, fingerprints, hand geometry, iris, voice, 
signature, gait, and keystroke (National Research Council of the National 
Academies, 2010 pp.31–34).  
Looking at biometrics as a process is an automated method of recognizing 
an individual. Biometrics as a process is used in two ways: verification and 
identification. Verification compares one biometric to an identified biometric (1:1) 
to verify that an individual is who he says he is. Identification compares one 
biometric to a database of biometrics (1:N) to find out who an individual is 
(Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), 2011, p45). When looking at the use 
of biometrics as a process, it is a series of procedures within a system. The 
functioning of a basic biometric system is a multi-step method where, in general, 
an individual presents a characteristic of himself or herself; then that 
characteristic(s) is captured by a sensor and converted into an algorithm sample; 
that sample is then compared to reference sample or baseline algorithms in a 
database; the conclusion of the process is the a match and non-match which 
allows a corresponding action such as entry into a secure structure. Systems that 
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perform biometric recognition exist within a constellation of other authentication 
and identification technologies and offer some distinct capabilities.  
Authentication technologies are typically based on one of three things: 
Something the individual knows, such as a password; 2. Something the individual 
has, such as a physical key or secure token; 3. Something the individual is or 
does. Biometric technologies employ the last of these. Unlike password or token-
based systems, biometric systems can function without active input, user 
cooperation, or knowledge that the recognition is taking place. One important 
difference between biometric and other authentication technologies, such as 
tokens, or passwords, is that these other technologies place trusts in cooperative 
users, allowing them to produce what they possess or demonstrate what they 
know (through dependence on the user’s safekeeping of a token or password). 
These other forms of authentication do not protect against the sharing or transfer 
to the token or secret, whereas biometric traits are tied to an individual—
specifically something an individual is or does (National Research Council of the 
National Academies, 2010, pp.5–6). 
Figure 7.   A Basic Biometric System from National Academy of Sciences, 2010 
Biometrics as a systems that are presently in use, typically use a single 
biometric trait or single modality (unibiometric) to establish identity. A recent 
trend in biometrics involves a shift from unibiometric to multibiometric systems. 
Unibiometric systems make use of a single source of biometric information to 
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perform identity determinations (verification, identification, negative recognition, 
etc.). Both theoretical research and empirical observation of fielded systems 
reveal that single modal unibiometric systems are subject to a variety of 
shortfalls. Ceilings on performance accuracy, poor subject population coverage, 
relatively high failure-to-enroll rates, and ease of circumvention are classic 
examples of such shortfalls. Some of the limitations of a unibiometric system can 
be addressed by designing a system that consolidates multiple sources of 
biometric information. This can be accomplished by fusing, for example, multiple 
traits of an individual or multiple feature extraction and matching algorithms 
operating on the same biometric. Multi-biometric systems, which rely on more 
than one source of biometric input, can be used to alleviate such shortfalls. 
Arguably, such systems may also include other sources of information including 
biographic, travel document-based, etc. (Ross, 2007, P1)  
Combining multiple sources of biometric information and databases has 
created a biometric fusion, which is the use of multibiometric inputs or methods 
of processing to improve performance. The traditional role of multibiometric 
fusion has been to increase system accuracy, increase the coverage across the 
population base, decrease instances of failures to acquire / failures to enroll, and 
increase the difficulty associated with circumvention. These four purposes 
directly relate to a subset of the characteristics typically used to evaluate a 
biometric modality. In evaluating multibiometric modality systems, Jain and Ross, 
leaders in the biometric field, initially came up with the characteristics to evaluate 
biometric systems. The characteristics that are commonly utilized to evaluate a 
biometric system are: universality, uniqueness, permanence, measurability, 
performance, acceptability, and circumvention (Bartlow, Nick and Zekster, 
Gregory,2009 p.2).  
The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Sub Committee on 
Biometrics provides the origins of biometrics; the term “biometrics” is derived 
from the Greek words “bio” (life) and “metrics” (to measure). Automated biometric 
systems have only become available over the last few decades, due to significant 
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advances in the field of computer processing. Many of these new automated 
techniques, however, are based on ideas that were originally conceived 
hundreds, even thousands of years ago (National Science and Technology 
Council, 2008, p.55). 
One of the oldest and most basic examples of a characteristic that is used 
for recognition by humans is the face. Since the beginning of civilization, humans 
have used faces to identify known (familiar) and unknown (unfamiliar) individuals. 
This simple task became increasingly more challenging as populations increased 
and as more convenient methods of travel introduced many new individuals into 
once small communities. The concept of human-to-human recognition is also 
seen in behavioral-predominant biometrics such as speaker and gait recognition. 
Individuals use these characteristics, somewhat unconsciously, to recognize 
known individuals on a day-to-day basis (National Science and Technology 
Council, 2008, p.56). 
Today, Biometrics is seen as the automated recognition of individuals 
based on their behavioral and biological characteristics. It is a tool for 
establishing confidence that one is dealing with individuals who are already 
known (or not known)—and consequently that they belong to a group with certain 
rights (or to a group denied certain privileges).   It relies on the presumption that 
individuals are physically and behaviorally distinctive in a number of ways. 
Biometric systems are used increasingly to recognize individuals and regulate 
access to physical spaces, information, service, and to other rights or benefits, 
including the ability to cross international borders. The motivations for using 
biometrics are diverse and often overlap. They include improving the 
convenience and efficiency of routine access transactions, reducing fraud and 
enhancing public safety and national security (National Research Council of the 
National Academies, 2010, p. 1). 
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1. Biometrics as a Characteristic or Process 
Biometrics is a general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic 
or a process. As a characteristic, biometrics is a measurable biological and 
behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition. A few of the 
current biological characteristics, commonly referred to as modalities, used to 
identify people are fingerprints, iris images, facial photos certain types of voice 
patterns, palm prints, and DNA. Behavioral characteristics / modalities can be a 
signature, the keystroke pattern on a keyboard, certain types of voice patterns, 
and gait (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2011, p. 45). The most common 
biometric modalities are:  
Face—Static or video images of a face can be used to facilitate 
recognition. Modern approaches are only indirectly based on the location, shape, 
and spatial relationships of facial landmarks such as eyes, nose, lips and chin, 
and so on.   
Fingerprints—The patterns of ridges and valleys on the “friction ridge” 
surfaces of fingers—have been used in forensic applications for over a century. 
Friction ridges are formed in utero during fetal development, and even identical 
twins do not have the same fingerprints. The recognition performance of currently 
available fingerprint-based recognition systems using prints from multiple fingers 
is quite good.   
Hand geometry—Hand geometry refers to the shape of the human hand, 
size of the palm and the lengths and widths of the fingers. Advantages to this 
modality are that is comparatively simple and easy to use.   
Iris—The iris, the circular colored membrane surrounding the eye’s pupil, 
is complex enough to be useful for recognition. The performance of systems 
using this modality is promising.   
Voice—Voice directly combines biological and behavioral characteristics. 
The sound an individual makes when speaking is based on physical aspects of 
the body (mouth, nose, lips, vocal cords, and so on) and can be affected by age, 
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emotional state, native language, and medical conditions. The quality of the 
recording device and ambient noise also influence recognition rates.   
Signature—How a person signs his or her name typically changes over 
time. It can also be strongly influenced by context, including physical conditions 
and the emotional state of the signer. Extensive experience has also shown that 
signatures are relatively easy to forge.   
Gait—Gait, the manner in which a person walks, has potential for human 
recognition at a distance and potentially, over an extended period of time. 
Keystroke—Keystroke dynamics are a biometric trait that some 
hypothesize may be distinctive to individuals. Keystroke dynamics are strongly 
affected by context, such as the person’s emotional state, his or her posture, type 
of keyboard, and so on (National Research Council of the National Academies, 
2010, pp. 31–34).   
Figure 8.   Biometric Modalities from AlMahafzah and AlRwashdeh, 2012 
 31 
Biometrics as a process is an automated method of recognizing an 
individual. Biometrics is used in two ways: verification and identification. 
Verification compares one biometric to an identified biometric (1:1) to verify that 
an individual is who he says he is. Identification compares one biometric to a 
database of biometrics (1:N) to find out who an individual is (Center for Army 
Lessons Learned, 2011, p. 45). 
When looking at the use of biometrics as a process, it is a process within a 
system. It cannot be stand-alone. Systems that perform biometric recognition 
exist within a constellation of other authentication and identification technologies 
and offer some distinct capabilities. Biometric technologies employ the last of 
these. Unlike password or token-based systems, biometric systems can function 
without active input, user cooperation, or knowledge that the recognition is taking 
place. One important difference between biometric and other authentication 
technologies, such as tokens, or passwords, is that these other technologies 
place trusts in cooperative users, allowing them to produce what they possess or 
demonstrate what they know (through dependence on the user’s safekeeping of 
a token or password). These other forms of authentication do not protect against 
the sharing or transfer to the token or secret, whereas biometric traits are tied to 
an individual—specifically something an individual is or does (National Research 
Council of the National Academies, 2010, pp. 5–6). 
2. Biometric Systems 
Most biometric systems that are presently in use typically use a single 
biometric trait or single modality (unibiometric) to establish identity (Ross, 2007, 
p. 1). A recent trend in biometrics involves a shift from unibiometric to 
multibiometric systems. Unibiometric systems make use of a single source of 
biometric information to perform identity determinations (verification, 
identification, negative recognition, etc.). Both theoretical research and empirical 
observation of fielded systems reveal that single modal unibiometric systems are 
subject to a variety of shortfalls. Ceilings on performance accuracy, poor subject 
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population coverage, relatively high failure-to-enroll rates, and ease of 
circumvention are classic examples of such shortfalls (Bartlow and Zekster, 
2009, p. 1). Some of the limitations of a unibiometric system can be addressed 
by designing a system that consolidates multiple sources of biometric 
information. This can be accomplished by fusing, for example, multiple traits of 
an individual or multiple feature extraction and matching algorithms operating on 
the same biometric.(Ross, 2007, p.1). Multi-biometric systems, which rely on 
more than one source of biometric input, can be used to alleviate such shortfalls. 
Arguably, such systems may also include other sources of information including 
biographic, travel document-based, etc.(Bartlow and Zekster,  2009, p.1 ).  
 
Figure 9.   Multibiometric system from Bartlow and Zekster, 2009 
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There are numerous advantages to multibiometrics. Besides enhancing 
matching accuracy, the other advantages of multibiometric systems over 
traditional unibiometric systems are: 1. Multibiometric systems address the issue 
of non-universality (i.e., limited population coverage) encountered by unibiometric 
systems. 2. Multibiometric systems can facilitate the filtering or indexing of large-
scale biometric databases. 3. It becomes increasingly difficult (if not impossible) 
for an imposter to spoof multiple biometric traits of a legitimately enrolled 
individual.  4. Multibiometric systems also effectively address the problem of 
noisy data. When the biometric signal acquired from a single trait is corrupted 
with noise, the availability of other (less noisy) traits may aid in the reliable 
determination of identity.  5. These systems also help in the continuous 
monitoring or tracking of an individual in situations when a single trait is not 
sufficient.  6. A multibiometric system may also be viewed as a fault tolerant 
system that continues to operate even when certain biometric sources become 
unreliable due to sensor or software malfunction, or deliberate user manipulation 
(Ross, 2007, p. 1). 
3. Multibiometric Fusion   
The utilization of biometrics in security systems is moving toward 
multibiometric systems. The newer multibiometric systems may be just as fast if 
not faster than the unibiometric system currently in place.  “Many years of 
research have demonstrated that multibiometric fusion, the process of 
consolidating multiple sources of biometric information can significantly improve 
system accuracy over unibiometric systems.”(Bartlow and Zekster, 2009, p.2). 
Combining multiple sources of biometric sources has created a biometric fusion, 
which is the use of multibiometric inputs or methods of processing to improve 
performance. As stated, the traditional role of multibiometric fusion has been to 
increase system accuracy, increase the coverage across the population base, 
decrease instances of failures to acquire / failures to enroll, and increase the 
difficulty associated with circumvention. These four purposes directly relate to a 
subset of the characteristics typically used to evaluate a biometric modality. In 
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evaluating multibiometric modality systems, Jain and Ross, leaders in the 
biometric field, initially came up with the characteristics to evaluate biometric 
systems. The characteristics and parameters that are commonly utilized to 
evaluate a biometric system are: 
1. Universality—Every individual accessing the application should possess 
a trait. 
2. Uniqueness—The given trait should be sufficiently different across 
individuals comprising the population. How this modality separates individuals 
from other individuals. 
3. Permanence—The biometric trait of an individual should be sufficiently 
invariant over a period of time with respect to the matching algorithm. How well 
the trait resists aging and fatigue over time. A trait that changes significantly over 
time is not a useful biometric.  
4. Collectability—the ability to acquire and digitize the biometric traits 
using suitable devices and do not cause undue inconvenience to the individual. 
This is the ability to acquire and digitize the multiple biometric traits.  
5. Performance—The recognition accuracy and the resources required to 
achieve that accuracy should meet the constraints imposed by the application. 
This includes speed, accuracy and robustness.  
6. Acceptability—Individuals in the target population who will use the 
application should be willing to present their biometric trait to the system. Public 
acceptance.  
7. Circumvention—This refers to the ease in which the trait of an individual 
can be imitated using artifacts (e.g., fake fingers), in the case of physical traits, 
and mimicry, in the case of behavioral traits (Bartlow and Zekster, 2009, p.2). 
 35 
 
Figure 10.   Parameter of Biometric Characteristics from Le, 2011 
The objective in evaluating biometric systems and utilizing biometric fusion 
is to improve system accuracy, efficiency, applicability, and robustness. Some 
types of biometric fusion have been used successfully for years in large-scale 
fingerprint identification systems (Hicklin, Ulery and Watson, 2006, p.1). The 
trend toward multibiometric systems has been particularly prevalent in large-
scale U.S. government systems such as Department of Defense Automated 
Biometric Identification System (DoD ABIS), Department of Homeland Security 
Automated Biometric Identification System (DHS IDENT), and FBI Next 
Generation Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), all 
examples of multibiometric systems (FBI, 2012). The analysis of multiple traits 
(particularly related to performance) associated with multibiometric systems must 
come at the expense of increased processing time and computational 
complexity. However, through careful application of emerging technological 
advances, multi-biometric systems may not have such negative side effects 
(Bartlow and Zekster, 2009). 
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E. BIOMETRICALLY ENHANCED SECURITY DATABASES AND 
PROGRAMS 
1. Governmental Biometric Databases 
In the 19th century, identity management was much simpler and the 
individuals addressed identify concerns in an appropriate way for their time, 
today society is far more complex. Birth certificates, naturalization papers, 
passports, and other government issued documents prove citizenship, but are 
not enough with the sophistication of forgery in documentation. To augment 
these well-established and familiar tokens of citizenship, biometrics has emerged 
as a reasonable and effective way to identify individuals and prove who they say 
they are (National Science and Technology Council, 2011, p.5).  
Government agencies have adopted biometrics for a variety of 
applications. For example, the criminal justice community, domestically and 
internationally, has been engaged in precursors to biometrics since the 1870’s. In 
1907, the Department of Justice (DOJ) established a Bureau of Criminal 
Identification, based upon fingerprints, and in 1924 charged the then-Bureau of 
Investigation with establishing a national identification and criminal history 
system that today is the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) division of 
the FBI. CJIS operates the national criminal history and fingerprint based 
identification program using the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (IAFIS) (National Science and Technology Council, 2011, p.5).  
Today, America’s national security community uses biometrics to resolve 
and then anchor the identity of known and suspected terrorists (KSTs) by linking 
information independently collected and maintained by the Department of 
Defense (DoD); State Department (DoS); Department of Homeland Security’s 
(DHS) - Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) and state and local law enforcement partners. Biometrics, 
fingerprints and DNA forensic evidence, matched against an array of national 
biometric databases, allows identification and apprehension of KSTs, aliens, 
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criminals and others who would like to do us harm (National Science and 
Technology Council, 2011, p.3). 
Interoperability in biometric programs is so vital that is was the subject of a 
June 2008 Presidential Directive, HSPD-24/NSPD-59, mandating that there can 
be no blockages or delays between the exchange of biometric and related 
information among key security agencies (BIMA, 2011, p.18). In the past decade, 
because of mandates and cooperation of numerous governmental agencies, 
advances have been made in the biometric technology in the government. The 
myriad of technical advances, interoperability remedies, sharing of information / 
data and the changes in the organization and peripheral cultural differences have 
allowed the current multibiometric capabilities, processes and systems to come 
into existence. Some of the major databases and programs that the government 
has because of this are described below. 
a. Department of Justice (DOJ) – Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). 
The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) 
is a national fingerprint and criminal history system that responds to requests 24 
hours a day, 365 days a year, to help our local, state, and federal partners—and 
our own investigators—solve and prevent crime and catch criminals and KSTs. 
The IAFIS is a large database that provides automated fingerprint search 
capabilities, latent search capability, electronic image storage, and electronic 
exchange of fingerprints. The system not only stores fingerprints, but 
corresponding criminal histories; mug shots; scars and tattoo photos; physical 
characteristics like height, weight, and hair and eye color; and aliases. The 
system also includes civil fingerprints, mostly of individuals who have served or 
are serving in the U.S. military or have been or are employed by the Federal 
government. Additionally, state, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies 
submit fingerprints voluntarily. The IAFIS is the largest biometric database in the 
world. It processed more than 61 million fingerprint submissions during fiscal 
year 2010 and housed the fingerprints and criminal histories for more than 70 
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million subjects in the criminal master file, along with more than 31 million civil 
prints. Included in DOJ- FBIs criminal database are fingerprints from 73,000 
KSTs processed by the U.S. or by international law enforcement agencies who 
work with the United States (FBI, n.d.). This biometric database includes 
biometric data from all military personnel and Federal employees. It also includes 
a majority of arrested individuals who have criminal records as well as latent 
fingerprints from crime scenes (Biometrics Task Force, 2010). 
b. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT). 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operates the 
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). IDENT was originally 
developed in 1994 as a biometrics collection and processing system for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Since that time, the INS, as well as 
numerous other organizations, were subsumed and reorganized into DHS. This 
change has meant that the intended use of IDENT has expanded beyond that for 
which it was initially designed. This has necessitated a revision to the system of 
records notice (SORN). IDENT is the primary DHS-wide system for the biometric 
identification and verification of individuals encountered in DHS mission-related 
processes. IDENT is primarily a biometric system that conducts identification or 
verification services on behalf of numerous U.S. Government programs that 
collect biometric and associated biographic data and is used for identification and 
verification services (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p.2). IDENT 
maintains fingerprints, photographs and biographic information on more than 126 
million individuals and conducts about 250,000 biometric transactions per day, 
averaging 10 seconds or less per transaction (National Science and Technology 
Council, 2011, p.5). The biometric data comes from visa applications, visitors 
entering the U.S., detainees from illegal border crossings and immigration 
violators (Biometrics Task Force, 2010). 
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c. Department of Defense (DoD), Biometrics Identity 
Management Agency (BIMA) – Automated Biometric 
Identification System (ABIS). 
DoD-ABIS is a proven multimodal biometric system and database, 
that enables DoD agencies to conduct automated biometric searches 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week and 365 days a year. The DoD-ABIS is the central repository 
and authoritative source for Defense Department multi-modal (face, fingerprint, 
iris and palm) biometric identity records for persons of interest. The network-
centric system is accessible worldwide and interfaces with other U.S. 
government agency data systems. In 2011, the ABIS database had received 
almost 6.4 million submissions of biometrics data (BIMA, 2011, p.9). The majority 
of the biometric data that is stored within ABIS comes from biometrics taken from 
foreign nationals at overseas locations, who typically wish to gain access to U.S. 
installations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Information also comes from 
latent fingerprints, IEDs and other hostile actions, enemy combatants and 
detainees (Biometrics Task Force, 2010). 
The Biometric Triad is comprised of three databases maintained by 
the DoD, DHS, and DOJ: the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System 
(ABIS), the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), and the 
DOJ/FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). The 
goal is to establish interoperability between the three databases. While the 
DOJ/FBI IAFIS is currently interoperable with DoD ABIS and DHS IDENT, DoD 
ABIS and DHS IDENT do not share mutual interoperability (Biometrics Task 
Force, 2010). The DoD ABIS already conducts fully automated data sharing with 
the FBI’s IAFIS database. The controlling agency of the ABIS database, BIMA, is 
working toward the same level of interoperability with DHS’ IDENT database, but 
has had difficulty coming to an agreement on the utilization and interfacing of the 
databases. The interoperability between the DoD ABIS and DHS IDENT 
represents the last remaining portion of the Biometrics Triad, per Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 24’s mandate for interagency biometric 
data sharing. While the DOJ/FBI IAFIS is currently interoperable with both DoD 
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ABIS and DHS IDENT, DoD ABIS and DHS IDENT do not share mutual 
interoperability. The DOS uses the DHS IDENT database for processing visa 
records and, when necessary, DoD and DHS share biometrics data and 
contextual information by loading biometric files onto a CD and hand-delivering 
the information to DHS for entry and storage in IDENT. The Biometrics Triad is 
working to bring an end to this slow and cumbersome work around procedure by 
setting the stage for automated interoperability, which will permit each database 
to share information with the other (Biometrics Task Force, 2010) The DoD ABIS 
already shares high-priority biometric datasets with key customers at DHS, such 
as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) (BIMA, 2011, pp.18–20). In order for 
the U.S. government to have a fully integrated, robust biometric database 
system, the loop must be closed. After the loop is closed and procedures are 
placed, many other governmental agencies will be able to incorporate biometrics 
and interface with the Biometric Triad. 
Figure 11.   The Triad Desired end state from Biometrics Task Force, 2010 
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The United States has made great strides in trying to utilize 
biometrics as a way of identification. Within the past decade the United States 
has introduced some biometric programs that utilize three databases to identify 
individuals so they may gain access to the United States. These are the initial 
programs that illustrate the potential of biometrics and their use to verify identity 
and grant access. The three main programs in use are United States Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (U.S.-VISIT), Global Entry (GE) and 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). Additionally the DOJ/FBI 
is developing the Next Generation Identification (NGI). 
2. Governmental Biometric Programs 
a. United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology (U.S.-VISIT) 
The United States has more than 300 official ports of entry where 
nearly a half billion crossings occur every year. The Department of State (DOS) 
considers more than 9 million visa applications annually. DHS processes nearly 
50,000 requests for asylum annually and processes approximately 30,000 
applications for immigration benefits every day (National Science and 
Technology Council, 2008, p.28). The DHS’ United States Visitor and Immigrant 
Status Indicator Technology (U.S.-VISIT) program provides biometric 
identification and analysis services to agencies throughout the immigration and 
border management, law enforcement, and intelligence communities to 
accurately identify people and assess whether or not they pose a risk to the 
United States. The U.S.-VISIT utilizes multibiometric system as its foundation 
because multiple traits are utilized and are unique, reliable, convenient and 
virtually impossible to forge. The U.S.-VISIT system uses the IDENT database 
provided by DHS. A complementary program from the Department of State (DoS) 
is BioVisa; a DoS program in which digital fingerprints and photographs like U.S.-
VISIT are collected at U.S. visa-issuing posts around the world and stored in the 
IDENT database.  
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The most visible U.S.-VISIT feature is the collection and analysis of 
biometrics—digital fingerprints and a photograph from international visitors at 
U.S. visa-issuing posts (collection of biometrics is handled by the DoS BioVisa 
Program and U.S.-VISIT provides the analysis of the data against IDENT data 
base) The IDENT database provides U.S.-VISIT government agency customers 
with the information they need to make efficient and well informed decisions on 
the status of an individual. There are numerous benefits of biometric and the 
U.S.-VISIT program The U.S.-VISIT program establish and verify international 
visitors’ identities for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or DOS 
consular officers to help them make admission or visa-issuance decisions 
(National Science and Technology Council, 2008, p.29). The CBP utilizes U.S.-
VISIT services at U.S. ports of entry to help facilitate legitimate travel, protect 
travelers against identity theft, prevent fraudulent document use, and keep our 
visitors and citizens safe from harm. The CBP officers are responsible for 
screening all international travelers to the United States. Using U.S.-VISIT 
services, officers quickly and accurately verify whether the person applying for 
entry is the same person to whom the visa was issued. And for all travelers, with 
or without a visa, officers use U.S.-VISIT services to verify that travelers are who 
they say they are and that they do not pose a threat to the United States (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 
 The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) uses the 
U.S.-VISIT program to help facilitate requests for immigration benefits. The U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers receive credible leads on 
immigration violators through U.S.-VISIT. This enhanced information-sharing 
process provides an increased capability to identify and apprehend overstays 
which is a critical tool with which to manage the immigration and border system. 
Before U.S.-VISIT, international travelers who overstayed their authorized period 
of admission were only identified as a consequence of some other encounter 
with law enforcement (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). The U.S.-
VISIT program establishes and verifies the identities of illegal migrants 
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apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) along U.S. land borders and the 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) at sea. The DoD uses biometric information about 
known or suspected terrorists on watch lists. The U.S.-VISIT program is working 
across the federal government to promote intelligence efforts in identifying high-
risk persons and KSTs. The U.S.-VISIT biometric services also facilitate 
identification of terrorists by matching against latent fingerprints collected from 
terrorist safe houses and ongoing criminal investigations conducted around the 
world (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 
b. Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC™)  
Since 9/11, DHS has focused time and attention on enhancing the 
security of U.S. ports, particularly because of the role the ports play in the U.S. 
economy. Each day, $1.3 billion worth of goods move in and out of U.S. ports. In 
addition, many major urban centers (more than half to the U.S. population) and 
significant critical infrastructure are in proximity to U.S. ports or are accessible by 
waterways. As points of the entry and exit program, they are critical nodes that 
affect terrorist travel and transiting of material support or weapons. The 
economic, physical, and psychological damage that would result from a 
significant terrorist attack targeting maritime commerce or exploiting America’s 
vulnerability at sea is difficult to estimate and a significant breakdown in the 
maritime transport system would affect the world economy (National Science and 
Technology Council, 2008, p.33). 
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC™) 
program is a Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Coast Guard 
initiative.  The TWIC™ program provides a tamper-resistant biometric credential 
to maritime workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities, 
outer continental shelf facilities, and vessels regulated under the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act, or MTSA, and all U.S. Coast Guard credentialed 
merchant mariners. An estimated 750,000 individuals require a TWIC™.  To 
obtain a TWIC™, an individual must provide biographic and biometric information 
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such as fingerprints, sit for a digital photograph and successfully pass a security 
threat assessment conducted by TSA (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2011). A TWIC™ incorporates a customized computer chip containing a 
biometric identifier, a photograph, biographic information, four different digital 
certificates, and interfaces that can communicate in contact or contactless mode 
with a reading device. A port worker, longshoreman, or maritime worker of any 
nationality who’s moving around at a U.S.-regulated port must have one 
(Homeland Security Defense Business Council, 2011, p.3–4).  
TWIC™ uses biometrics for two primary identification purposes:  
background screening and verification. Background screening occurs prior to the 
issuance of a TWIC™ and encompasses an FBI criminal history records check 
and a check of DHS’ IDENT database. Post-issuance, biometrics may be used at 
access control points to endure that the biometrics of the individual attempting to 
use the TWIC™ match those stored within the credential (National Science and 
Technology Council, 2008, p.34). 
c. Global Entry (GE) Trusted Traveler Network 
Global Entry is a program managed by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) that allows pre-approved, low-risk travelers expedited 
clearance upon arrival into the United States. Currently, only U.S. citizens and 
lawful permanent residents are eligible to join. Upon returning from international 
travel, Global Entry-enrolled travelers may bypass the regular passport control 
line and proceed directly to the Global Entry kiosk. The Global Entry process 
requires participants to present their machine-readable U.S. passport or 
permanent residency card, submit their fingerprints for biometric verification, and 
make a customs declaration at the kiosk’s touch screen. The kiosk will compare 
the fingerprints presented to the fingerprints on file with the IDENT Database to 
confirm the traveler’s identity. Upon successful completion of the Global Entry 
process at the kiosk, the traveler will be issued a transaction receipt and directed 
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to baggage claim and the exit unless chosen for a selective or random secondary 
referral (National Science and Technology Council, 2008, p.36). 
d. Next Generation Identification – (NGI) 
The events leading up to 9/11 showed these databases and 
searches were neither comprehensive enough nor rapid enough to support all 
counterterrorism challenges. Files have to be exchanged with DHS, DOS, and 
others to ensure that checks made by one department would not miss known or 
suspected terrorists (KST), persons with criminal backgrounds, etc. Biometric-
based information also needed to be better coordinated among the intelligence 
community in order to “connect the dots.”  Additionally, every day, local, state, 
tribal, and Federal law enforcement agencies in the United States arrest more 
than 50,000 people and well over 60,000 people a day apply for positions of 
trust, visas to visit the United States, for citizenship, etc. (National Science and 
Technology Council, 2008, p.37). In each case, a check has to be made to 
determine if there are any facts that would make them unsuitable or indicate that 
they may not be trusted. The FBI meets these identification challenges through 
electronic processing of fingerprint-based background checks by its CJIS 
Division using the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS). 
Driven by advances in technology, customer requirements, and 
growing demand for Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS) services, the FBI has initiated the Next Generation Identification (NGI) 
program. This program will further advance the FBI’s biometric identification 
services, providing an incremental replacement of current IAFIS technical 
capabilities, while introducing new functionality. The NGI system will offer state-
of-the-art biometric identification services and provide a flexible framework of 
core capabilities that will serve as a platform for multimodal functionality. The 
future of identification systems is currently progressing beyond the dependency 
of a unimodal (e.g., fingerprint) biometric identifier towards multimodal biometrics 
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(i.e., voice, iris, facial, etc.). The NGI Program will advance the integration 
strategies and indexing of additional biometric data that will provide the 
framework for a future multimodal system that will facilitate biometric fusion 
identification techniques. The framework will be expandable, scalable, and 
flexible to accommodate new technologies and biometric standards, and will be 
interoperable with existing systems. Once developed and implemented, the NGI 
initiatives and multimodal functionality will promote a high level of information 
sharing, support interoperability, and provide a foundation for using multiple 
biometrics for positive identification (FBI, n.d.). 
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The current aviation security passenger-screening program has been a 
program of “one size fits all” since the tragic events of 9/11. This program has 
impacted the way United States citizens travel, which has had an effect on the 
economy of the United States. A trusted traveler program should be implemented 
in the United States. This trusted traveler aviation security passenger-screening 
program should use risk management as its foundation. The basic logic of the 
trusted traveler program is to reallocate security resources from those “low-risk” 
travelers and devote them to the unknown risk population.   
The literature has differing opinions on the key elements that should be 
included for the trusted traveler program. It is agreed the program should be 
voluntary, include a thorough background check and reduce resources needed. 
Where the opinions differ; however, is how to implement the program. While 
adopting a common trusted traveler aviation security passenger-screening 
program would have many potential benefits, the literature lacks specific details 
that could affect implementation. This appears to be a gap within the literature.  
The literature indicates a risk-based security framework for aviation 
passenger screening has been adopted by the TSA for many different 
exploratory pilot programs in 2011. By adopting these risk-based methodologies, 
the TSA is improving checkpoint efficiency while decreasing aviation passenger 
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wait times and providing tax savings to the U.S. taxpayer. These programs have 
had success, but critical examination through literature shows that these 
programs do not incorporate a mechanism for positive identity authentication; 
they only utilize identity documentation for authentication.   
A current challenge of the current RBS initiative is it does not incorporate 
biometric identification validation into the process. The TSA as an agency 
continues to only utilize documentation to validate passenger entry into the 
secure passenger screening area. A way to improve entry into the secure 
passenger screening area is to incorporate a biometric validation process and a 
risk-based “Trusted Traveler” program, while expediting and enhancing the low-
risk passenger traveling experience. Truly legitimate passenger security requires 
positive identification authentication of trusted travelers to be able to differentiate 
between the “trusted traveler” and those who mean to do us harm. This RBS 
initiative will assist the TSA by concentrating their limited resources on a very 
small percentage of passengers who are unknown or have indicators of doing 
harm from validated trusted travelers.  
Technology has made monumental advances in the past ten years in the 
automated recognition of individuals based on biological and behavioral 
characteristics. There has been increased eagerness to utilize biometrics 
because it increases convenience and efficiency for routine access, validates an 
individual’s identification, and reduces fraud while enhancing public safety and 
security. Biometrics have been incorporated into systems and have utilized a 
single biometric trait or single modality system up until the past few years. The 
literature illustrates the new trend for biometric systems is to employ 
multibiometric traits or multimodal systems that utilize multiple biometric sources 
to create a biometric “fusion” that significantly improves system accuracy. Until 
recently, the nexus of biometrics and the way they have been evaluated has 
been inconsistent. Adopting common evaluation characteristic criteria for 
biometric systems will assist with evaluating and improving, while providing a 
common benchmark for implementation.    
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The United States government in the past decade has adopted, on a large 
scale, biometrically enhanced security programs. The advent of these programs 
has shown there is an inconsistency in sharing standards and a stove piping of 
information based on departments. The literature suggests they are trying to 
bridge the gap between these databases and programs and are creating a 
“biometric triad” that fully integrates the government’s three main databases and 
programs. The majority of large governments and agencies are adopting and 
incorporating biometrics as their identification standard. The adoption of 
biometrics is increasing the efficiency, accuracy and reliability of services and 
processes in the validation of identification for their internal programs.   
A gap that has been found is biometrics have not been incorporated into 
all departments and agencies that have a service of identity verification role for 
national security and public safety. Currently, the TSA does not use biometrics in 
their RBS APSP program and serious consideration should be given because of 
the vital role it has in our national security and economy.   
The TSA will continue the struggle to maintain a balance between 
carefully screening passengers and crewmembers while avoiding undue delays 
to the traveling public. Further study and research in the utilization of biometrics 
into a risk-based screening process could make for a better passenger screening 
system. The TSA will never be able to function as a truly risk-based organization 
until the agency can differentiate between a passenger’s identity-based on every 
level of risk. The TSA must develop an expedited screening program using 
biometric credentials that would allow the TSA to positively identify trusted 
passengers and crewmembers, so the agency can prioritize its screening 
resources on individuals of high risk while speeding up the screening process 
(Peterman, Elias and Frittelli, 2011, p.5). 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD  
A. APPROACH  
The research was conducted in four steps: 
1. Analyze Risk-Based Security-- Analyze the TSA RBS initiatives 
currently being incorporated into the aviation passenger-screening model. 
Analysis of three RBS initiatives (KCM, DoD CAC, and TSA Pre✓™) will review 
strengths, limitations and gaps in security efficiency and reliability.   
2. Identify Current Biometric Technologies-- Identify current 
biometric technologies that exist today and are commercially available, that can 
be incorporated to improve passenger identity authentication. Current biometric 
characteristic (i.e., iris, facial recognition, fingerprint) technologies utilized in 
biometric systems for improving efficiency, reliability and precision in common 
practices and day-to-day activities will be examined to discover strengths and 
limitations.  
3. Analyze Biometrically Enhanced Security Programs-- Discover 
the strengths and limitations of other successful biometrically enhanced security 
programs, both governmental and non-governmental. Discover the strengths, 
limitations and gaps in security efficiency and reliability of these programs. 
4. Integrate Biometric Technologies into a Risk-Based Security 
Program Model—Explore improving the current RBS aviation passenger 
screening model by incorporating biometric security enhancements discovered in 
earlier phases of this research to improve efficiency and reliability. 
Recommendations will be applied to the current model by incorporating biometric 
technology into the current model to create a feasible and ideal RBS aviation 
passenger-screening checkpoint that incorporates biometrically enhanced 
security measures.   
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B. DATA SAMPLE FOR ANALYSIS   
The research steps are discussed in detail below. 
1. Analyze Risk-Based Security 
The data sample for analyzing Risk-Based Security (RBS) was compiled 
and derived from the current TSA RBS Initiatives: KCM, Secure Flight, TSA 
Pre✓™ programs. The data came from TSA documentation (websites, studies, 
agency literature). The data analysis of the RBS initiatives attempted to find the 
strengths, limitations and gaps in security that exist in the current aviation 
passenger-screening model. The analysis aimed to show the security limitations 
and potential security gaps at checkpoints. It identified where biometric security 
enhancement measures can possibly be incorporated to bridge and address the 
limitations of the identified security checkpoint gaps.  
2. Identify Current Biometric Technologies  
The data sample for identifying biometric characteristic technologies was 
material published by leading researchers, the federal government’s biometric 
agencies and leading commercial enterprises. The data was collected from 
resources such as: 
 
• The Biometric Consortium (biometrics.org), which is the focal point 
for research, development, testing evaluation, and application of 
biometric-based personal identification/verification technology,  
• Biometrics.gov, the central source of information on biometrics-
related activities of the Federal government, and  
• The FBI Biometric Center of Excellence (BCOE), the leading 
government program for exploring and advancing the use of new 
and enhanced biometric technologies and capabilities for 
integration into operations.  
 
Interviews were conducted of senior policymaking leadership in order to 
gain insight and emerging technology to try to discover technology that can be 
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fielded within the next 18–24 months to better enhance security at aviation 
security checkpoints. This information is not readily available in written 
documentation because much of the technology is new and rapidly developing; 
there is a revolution in biometric technology security enhancements and new 
enhancements are being discovered every day. The interviews were conducted 
to capture the gaps that may exist in the literature. Individuals from the following 
organizations were interviewed: 
 
• Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Biometrics 
Center of Excellence (BCOE). BCOE is it is the FBI’s program for 
exploring and advancing the use of new and enhanced biometric 
technologies and capabilities for the integration into operations. 
BCOE focuses its efforts on fostering collaboration, improving 
information sharing and advancing the adoption of identity 
management solutions within the FBI across national security 
communities. 
• Department of Homeland Security Automated Biometric 
Identification System (IDENT) is a DHS-wide system for the storage 
and processing of biometric and limited biographic information of 
DHS national security, law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, 
and other DHS mission-related functions, and to provide associated 
testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis, or 
other administrative uses. 
• Department of Defense Biometric Identity Management Agency 
(BIMA). BIMA was chosen because it is a premier organization 
dedicated to protecting the nation through the employment of 
biometric capabilities and is DoD’s lead program to coordinate, 
integrate, and synchronize biometric technologies and capabilities 
in support of national security. 
• FST21 Ltd. The Corporation FST21 Ltd. was chosen because it is 
an award winning biometric corporation that designs identity-based 
solutions using next-generation biometric technology for providing 
security. This non-government corporation is utilizing facial and 
voice recognition as a key component to its biometric solutions. 
 
During these interviews no personally identifiable information (PII) or 
personal health information PHI (PHI) was collected. The analysis attempted to 
discover the strengths and limitations of current biometric characteristics 
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technology. The outcome of the analysis was to identify promising biometric 
characteristic technology available in terms of efficiency (cost, speed and 
practicality), reliability (low failure rate) and anticipated utilization for integration 
into the RBS initiatives for aviation passenger screening. Not every biometric 
company or organization was researched or interviewed; only some 
companies/organizations that have promising technologies available for TSA to 
leverage. 
3. Biometrically Enhanced Security Programs 
The data sample for examining other biometrically enhanced security 
programs was government and non-government commercial enterprises utilizing 
biometrically enhanced security measures in their security. The analysis focused 
on successful uses and strengths of biometric technology in government 
departments and agencies, as well as non-government commercial enterprises. 
A review of the following programs was conducted: 
 
• DOJ/FBI’s IAFIS program 
• DHS’s IDENT program 
• DoD’s BIMA ABIS databases 
• United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
(U.S.-VISIT) 
• Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and  
• Global Entry (GE) programs  
 
These programs have been on the forefront of incorporating biometrically 
enhanced security measures into government programs. Through inquiry of 
these programs, the data analysis sought to discover insight into possible 
biometrically enhanced security measures that can be incorporated or modeled 
after for improving RBS initiatives into the aviation passenger-screening model.   
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4. Integrate Biometric Technologies into a Risk-Based Security 
Program 
This section of the thesis will integrate biometric technologies into the risk-
based security programs and the current aviation passenger-screening model. 
Process Modeling of the current RBS initiatives program to incorporate biometric 
security enhancements discovered in the earlier steps of this research will 
attempt to show how to improve the efficiency and reliability of the aviation 
passenger-screening design. The anticipated outcome of the program evaluation 
and inquiry will be to discover, envision, design, and create an unrealized 
possibility for an improved RBS initiatives aviation passenger-screening model. 
The goal will be to seek the amalgamation of all or some of these biometric 
technologies into the RBS initiatives aviation passenger-screening model to 
create an improved security checkpoint at all U.S. federalized airports improving 
security efficiency and reliability and decreasing the cost of the current model.   
C. SUMMARY 
Modeling the current RBS initiatives programs to incorporate biometric 
security enhancements discovered in the analysis and research from this study 
explores how to improve the efficiency and reliability of the aviation passenger-
screening design. The anticipated outcome of the program evaluation and inquiry 
were to discover, envision, design, and create an unrealized possibility for an 
improved RBS initiatives aviation passenger-screening model. The findings from 
the program evaluation, research and inquiry incorporated the best practices and 
most promising concepts and illustrate by integration what advantages they 
would bring to the current RBS initiatives aviation passenger-screening program. 
The goal of the thesis is to seek the amalgamation of all or some of these 
biometric technologies into the RBS initiatives aviation passenger-screening 
program to create an improved security checkpoint at all U.S. federalized airports 
improving security efficiency and reliability and decreasing the cost of the current 
model.   
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This chapter conducts analysis that follows the method contained in 
Chapter III. Using literature on the TSA’s RBS program, the first step analyzed 
three of the six current RBS initiative programs that have the greatest potential 
for incorporating biometric technology to enhance security. The programs that 
have the greatest potential for integrating biometric technology are: TSA Pre✓™   
DoD’s CAC and KCM. The analysis shows a detailed overview of possible 
vulnerabilities within the current systems. The next step examined the current 
biometric technologies that were the most favorable to be utilized in providing 
security enhancement for the TSA RBS initiatives. The data was collected from 
U.S. Government documents, reports, news media, scholarly works and 
interviews of senior policy makers. The last step in this analysis chapter was to 
analyze U.S. Government biometrically enhanced security programs and 
commercial biometric capabilities. The programs examined were DHS’s United 
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (U.S.-VISIT) program, 
TSA’s Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, CBP’s 
Global Entry (GE) program, and DOJ/FBI’s Next Generation Identification – (NGI) 
which is an emerging future program. The data collected was from reports, 
scholarly works and interviews. Cumulatively the analysis was utilized to make a 
recommendation for how to improve the current RBS initiative programs and 
make an ideal, near-future biometrically enhanced security checkpoint. The 
analysis provides a holistic view on how the TSA can better the RBS initiatives 
while improving the Aviation Passenger-Screening Program and procedures with 
biometrics. 
B. OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE  
Incorporating biometric technology into the current Risk Based Security 
Initiatives aviation passenger-screening program can improve effectiveness of 
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airport security checkpoints by reducing the long wait times and reducing the 
length of the lines. The incorporation of biometric technology would improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the checkpoints by more rapidly validating an 
individual’s identification, determining the trustworthiness level of the passenger 
or “trusted traveler”; in turn this will lessen the requirements and level of scrutiny 
for checkpoint screening.  
In a trusted traveler program, upon reaching a position in a separate 
security line for just trusted traveler enrollees, the traveler would present 
biometric information to a TSA managed biometric collection device. Upon 
biometric validation of the individual’s identification as a trusted traveler, the 
traveler would pass through special security checkpoints without divesting 
personal items in pockets and would leave external garments and shoes on. 
Separately, carry-on bags would be x-rayed and scrutinized for certain 
dangerous items not to be brought onto the aircraft (U.S. Travel Association n.d. 
pp.13–14). The efficiency and effectiveness of the checkpoints would increase 
because of reduced item removal and divesting burden requirements. Wait times 
would lessen because of the improved procedure and lines would decrease by 
validating trustworthy passengers who would need fewer inspections and 
scrutiny at security checkpoints since they are a low risk or threat to the aviation 
enterprise. This new approach greatly increases risk mitigation from the current 
approach utilized today.   
C. RBS INITIATIVE PROGRAMS ANALYSIS 
1. TSA Pre✓™    
The purpose of TSA Pre✓™   is to have expedited security screening 
based on risk category. Under TSA Pre✓™   individuals provide information 
about themselves prior to flying in order to potentially expedite their screening 
process and travel experience. By learning about travelers through the 
information they voluntarily provide, the TSA can classify passengers into one of 
three risk categories; low-risk: passengers who have been subjected to a 
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background check, have been vetted and deemed to be a trusted traveler; 
unknown: passengers the TSA does not have enough information on to deem 
them low or high-risk and have not been vetted; and high-risk:  passengers who 
are on watch lists, selectee lists and no-fly lists and pose a possible danger to  
other passengers. This is conducted through Secure Flight, which is a TSA 
program that matches passenger information to government watch lists. Secure 
Flight begins 72 hours prior to, up to just hours prior to a passenger’s flight by 
confirming a person’s identity, reviewing the boarding pass. This vetting allows a 
passenger to be placed into a category. Those low-risk passengers are allowed 
to enter into the TSA Pre✓™   lane for expedited screening. In the TSA Pre✓™    
lane, passengers do not have to remove their shoes or belts, divest items from 
pockets and they are allowed to wear a light jacket as they process through the 
lane. Additionally, passengers no longer have to remove laptops or liquids, 
aerosols or gels less than 3.4 ounces from their carry-on baggage. This greatly 
lessens the wait time at security checkpoints where most passengers are 
passing through security checkpoints in less than one minute. With fewer 
screening requirements, the TSA can adjust its resources both on equipment and 
personnel to focus on high-risk passengers. Currently there are two ways an 
individual can be enrolled into the new TSA Pre✓™   program. One is by joining 
CBP’s Global Entry program. Which is a biometrically enhanced security program 
for international travelers returning to the United States. In order to join this 
program one must be a U.S. citizen, undergo an extensive background check 
vetting including criminal and terrorist background checks followed by a sit down 
interview with a uniformed Customs and Border Protection Law Enforcement 
Officer (LEO). During the interview a 2D biometric facial photograph is taken and 
10-point fingerprints are taken as well creating a reference biometric in the 
database. Additionally, there is a $100 enrollment fee that is good for five years 
and the program is voluntary. The individual must meet all requirements in order 
to be enrolled. By having a Global Entry card you are authorized to utilize the 
TSA Pre✓™   lane. Another way to be enrolled in the TSA Pre✓™   lane is by 
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being a U.S. citizen that is a member of participating airline upper tier frequent 
flyer programs who has met the requirements for significant flown 
mileage/segment totals for eligibility. Additionally, the individual may be subject to 
an intelligence risk-assessment conducted by TSA. Furthermore, selection is 
recommended by the airline and the individual must voluntarily submit to the 
requirements of the program.  
TSA Pre✓™   has been in existence since late 2011 and in essence is an 
airline based program designed to be used by premier passengers and is not 
available to the larger pool of passengers who may be eligible to use the TSA 
Pre✓™ lanes. TSA has stated their goal is to have 70% of passengers enrolled, 
but currently has less than 10% of passengers enrolled in the program. The main 
reason sited is pre-check eligibility is complicated due to confusing rules from 
airline to airline and can frustrate passengers. Additionally, the process for 
notifying passengers is not clear and even if the passenger is eligible, the 
passenger can only use the pre-check on the carrier that offered them the 
enrollment into pre-check in the first place (Crosby, 2012, pp.23–24).   
The analysis of this program shows it is not standardized in how 
enrollment is conducted, who is eligible for the program, how the vetting process 
is directed, and who is in control of the process. There is insufficient consistency 
in the background checks. For example, some are enrolled simply based on the 
frequency of their travel with no verification of their true identity. Other individuals 
must go through an entire governmental criminal/terrorist background check and 
voluntarily submitting their biometrics for enrollment. 
2. DoD’s CAC  
Active duty members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast 
Guard, as well as active duty members of the National Guard and Reserve, who 
are issued Common Access Cards (CAC) by their departments are eligible to 
participate in the TSA Pre✓™ lanes (Transportation Security Administration, 
2012). DoD CACs are smart cards the size of a credit card and are standard 
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identification for members of the Uniformed Services, Selected Reserve, DoD 
civilian employees, and eligible contractor personnel. This is the principle card 
used to gain access to military installations, buildings and computer networks 
and systems. The card contains a computer chip, which holds name, gender, 
benefits and privileges information, blood type and organ donor information 
(military only), digital certificates and other application-specific data. The card 
also contains an updateable magnetic strip used for building access information 
as well as a barcode containing name, SSN, DOB, personnel category, pay 
category, benefits information, organizational affiliation and pay grade. Biometric 
data is stored on these cards as well (www.dmdc.osd.mil/smartcard, 2012). 
Individuals who possess a DoD CAC may enter the TSA Pre✓™ lanes for 
expedited screening and do not to be in uniform.   
Analysis of this program under TSA Pre✓™ shows numerous individuals 
may obtain DoD CACs including contractors and non-U.S. citizens which creates 
a possible security gap where a non-eligible individual could circumvent the 
system and gain access. Additionally, some of these CACs are still retained after 
service members leave active duty service or retire. This makes them ineligible, 
but they can still access the TSA Pre✓ lanes with the card in their possession. In 
the future, the long-term vision is that TSA’s Secure Flight and DoD will partner 
to identify and verify DoD personnel prior to being able to use the TSA Pre✓™ 
lane. Currently, the option to automatically be enrolled and code their boarding 
passes for TSA Pre✓™ does not exist. It must be done manually. Active duty 
personnel present their CAC and boarding pass to the document checker in the 
TSA Pre✓™ lane who then will scan the CAC to verify the status of the Active 
Duty member with the DoD. This program has had issues in the preliminary 
stages with connectivity and equipment. 
3. KCM  
Know Crew Member is a joint partnership effort with Airlines for America. 
The Air Line Pilots Association, and TSA that allows uniformed flight deck crew 
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members (airline pilots and flight attendants) expedited access into the sterile 
area through exit lanes, checkpoints and common access areas. The 
crewmembers no longer go through aviation passenger-screening checkpoints 
and no longer go through traditional screening processes. Crewmembers merely 
show their airline credentials with photograph at one of the KCM access points 
that has a CrewPASSTM access management workstation. This workstation is 
utilized by a TSO to validate the identity and privilege status of each airline 
crewmember. When using CrewPASS, each uniformed crewmember will present 
the TSO with their airline badge containing their photograph, airline name, and 
employee ID number.   The crewmember’s employee ID number, airline 
employer and fingerprint are forwarded via encrypted link to the ARINC 
CrewPASS Server. This service is located in ARINC’s secure computer facility (a 
privately owned facility) in Annapolis, Maryland.   
The CrewPASS access process provides an expedited screening process 
for U.S. commercial airline crewmembers. In fact, no screening is accomplished 
at all. If the employee ID matches the query to the CrewPASS Server the 
crewmember is granted access to the sterile area bypassing the traditional 
screening process.  
Analysis of this program shows the CrewPASS architecture has the 
potential to provide both an employee verification and biometric component, but 
the biometric portion has not yet been implemented (Ryan, 2010, pp. 1–4). The 
current CrewPASS architecture utilizes former Cockpit Access Security System 
(CASS) to create a separate CrewPASS system and database. The entries into 
the database are performed and maintained by the airlines themselves. 
Effectively, the database verifies whether the crewmember is still employed by 
the airline and is still in good standing when the query is made at the CrewPASS 
workstation by the TSO. The security gap here is the database is maintained by 
the airlines and absent the biometric portion of the system, the identity of the 
crewmember cannot be verified. 
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4. Summary of RBS Initiative 
Analysis of the RBS initiatives programs showed there are numerous low-
risk trusted travelers who can go through expedited screening processes to 
reduce the burden on the exponentially growing passenger loads and travel 
experience. There are numerous databases and systems being used to vet 
eligible low-risk travelers. The fundamental security gap that everything points to 
is there is not a process to verify the identity of any of these trusted travelers. 
There is no standardization in the classification, vetting, validating and entering 
them into the low-risk population. Furthermore, some of the systems have the 
potential to incorporate biometrics into the pre-screening and screening process, 
yet to date have not been utilized for verification of these potential low-risk 
travelers. This creates a less then optimal alternate aviation passenger-screening 
system. 
D. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES (MODALITIES) 
A biometric modality refers to a system built to recognize a particular 
biometric trait. Face, fingerprint, hand geometry, palm print, and iris are all 
examples of biometric traits. Biometric systems are not modality specific but have 
major implications for system design and performance (Whither Biometrics 
Committee, 2010, pp.31–32). Biometrics are used for many different purposes. 
They are either part of a biometric verification system or an identification system. 
The verification system seeks to answer the question, “Is this person who s/he 
says s/he is?” The system checks his/her biometrics sensor scan such as face, 
fingerprint or iris against the baseline biometric digital template in the database 
file. Verification systems are 1:1 matching systems because the system matches 
the biometric presented by the individual against a biometric already on file. This 
type of system is usually faster and more accurate than identification systems 
even when the size of the database increases. On the other hand, identification 
systems seek to identify an unknown person or his/her unknown biometric. They 
try to answer the question, “Who is this person?” Identification systems try to 
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check biometrics presented against all others already in the database. These are 
described as a 1:n system where n is the total number of biometrics in the 
database. An example of this is where a latent fingerprint is picked up at a crime 
scene and an attempt is made to identify that unknown person by that biometric 
trait (Lynch, 2010, pp. 4–6).   
Figure 12.   Diagrams of enrollment, verification, and identification tasks  from 
Jain and Ross, 2004 
While researching next generation identity verification it was discovered 
that person authentication using fingerprint or voice biometrics traits has 
increasingly been deployed for day-to-day security and surveillance applications. 
As outlined, one of the most acceptable non-intrusive physical attributes to 
authenticate and verify is the face. In one study, next generation identity 
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verification based on face/gait biometrics, they conducted a comparison of 
various biometric technologies against the standard biometric criteria established 
by Jain, one of the predominant biometric experts in the field. From the report the 
choice of a particular human characteristic to be used as a biometric trait 
depends on the following criteria:  
• Uniqueness is how well the biometric separates individually from 
another 
• Permanence measures how well a biometric resists aging. 
• Collectability ease of acquisition for measurement. 
• Performance accuracy, speed, and robustness of technology 
used. 
• Acceptability degree of approval of a technology. 
• Circumvention ease of use of a substitute 
From the study a table was created that shows a comparison of existing 
biometric systems in terms of the above criteria. From the comparison of various 
biometric technologies according to AK Jain, face, fingerprint, iris and DNA were 
the highest performing modalities for identification verification through biometrics 









Table 1.   Biometric Technology Comparison Table from Jain, 2004 
Additionally, interviews with senior policy makers in the biometric field 
validated the findings that fingerprints, face and iris are the highest performing 
modalities for identity verification using biometrics. Because of this, it was 
decided to focus on these three modalities as the most promising for 
implementation into the RBS Aviation Passenger-Screening Program; facial 
recognition, fingerprint recognition and iris recognition. These three were 
selected based on research conducted by the National Science and Technology 
Council, National Research Council of the National Academies and interviews 
with senior policy makers and academicians in the biometric field who 
recommended these three as being the best for incorporating into a biometric 
verification system. There is universal consensus that not one biometric modality 
is best for all implementations and the more modalities utilized in verification the 
better the probability of positive identity verification. 
1. Facial Recognition 
The human face plays an irreplaceable role in biometrics technology due 
to some of its unique characteristics. First, most cameras are non-invasive; 
therefore face verification systems are one of the most publicly acceptable 
verification technologies in use. Another advantage is that face detection 
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systems can work mostly without the cooperation of the user concerned, which is 
therefore very convenient for the general user (Kumar and Srinivasan, 2012, 
p.43). Face recognition is a non-intrusive method, and facial attributes are 
probably the most common biometric features used by humans to recognize one 
another. The applications of facial recognition range from a static, controlled 
“mug-shot” authentication to a dynamic, uncontrolled face identification in a 
cluttered background (Ross, Nandakumar and Jain, 2006, p.21). Humans 
recognize familiar faces with considerable ease, but they have difficulty 
recognizing unfamiliar individuals. Since the 1960’s machine vision, researchers 
have been developing automated methods for recognizing individuals via their 
facial characteristics. Despite the volumes of research, there are no agreed-upon 
methods for automated face recognition such as there are for fingerprints, but 
they are rapidly reaching a consensus that 3D imaging will be the standard.   
Multiple approaches have existed for several years using low-resolution 2D 
images. Recent work in high-resolution 2D and 3D show the potential to greatly 
improve face recognition accuracy (National Science and Technology Council, 
n.d. p.81). Furthermore, there has been rapid development of 3D image 
technology. Using 3D image technology has become another alternative in the 
field of biometrics.  3D facial templates record the exact geometry of a person 
and are irrelevant with respect to the illumination changes of the environment or 
the orientation changes of the person (Li and Barreto, 2005, p. 1). However, 
there has been significant progress in improving the performance of computer-
based face recognition algorithms over the last decade. It was discovered that 
computer face recognition using algorithms now surpasses the human ability to 
recognize a face. In other words, computers have become more accurate at 
recognizing human faces, even more so than humans themselves (O’Toole, 
Phillips, Jiang et al., 2006, p.1). In other studies it has been found 3D face 
recognition and identification have definite advantages; some of which are:  face 
recognition is a modality that humans largely depend on to authenticate other 
humans; face recognition is a modality that requires no or only weak cooperation 
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to be useful; face authentication can be advantageously included in multimodal 
systems, not only for authentication purposes but also to confirm the aliveness of 
the signal source of fingerprints, iris, etc. (Li and Barreto, 2005, p.2)  The future 
of biometric technology is demonstrating that facial recognition will be at the 
forefront of biometrics for many years to come and may someday replace the 
centuries old system of using fingerprints. 
 
Figure 13.   Illustration of Facial Recognition from fbi.gov 
2. Fingerprint Recognition 
Fingerprint recognition is by far the most well known and the oldest 
biometric modality that is in use today. Humans have used fingerprints for 
personal identification for centuries dating back to the Chinese in the 14th 
Century. The matching (i.e., identification) accuracy using fingerprints has been 
shown to be very high. A fingerprint is the pattern of ridges and valleys on the 
surface of a fingertip whose formation is determined during the first seven 
months of fetal development (Ross, Nandakumar and Jain, 2006, p.21). Manual 
comparison of fingerprints for recognition has been in use for many years, and 
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has become an automated biometric identification technique over the past two 
decades. Patterns have been extracted by creating an inked impression of the 
fingertip on paper. Today, compact sensors provide digital images of these 
patterns. Fingerprint recognition for identification acquires the initial image 
through live scan of the finger by direct contact with a reader device. The feature 
extraction module to compute the feature values uses images acquired by the 
sensors. The matching process involves comparing the two-dimensional minutiae 
patterns extracted from the user’s print with those in the template (Kumar and 
Srinivasan, 2012, p.41). A major problem with the current fingerprint recognition 
systems is that they require a large amount of computational resources, 
especially when operating in the identification mode. Lastly, fingerprints of a 
small fraction of the population may be unsuitable for automatic identification 
because of genetic factors, ageing, environmental, or occupational reasons (e.g., 
manual workers may have a large number of cuts and bruises on their 
fingerprints that keep changing) or digits may even be missing (Ross, 
Nandakumar and Jain, 2006). Despite technological hindrances fingerprints are 
still the most widely accepted biometric trait since fingerprint templates have 
been created and stored for over a hundred years. 
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Figure 14.   Illustration of Digital Fingerprinting from escanfingerprinting.ca 
3. Iris recognition 
The iris is the colored portion of an individual’s eye. To obtain a good 
image of the iris, identification systems typically illuminate the iris with near-
infrared light, which can be observed by most cameras yet is not detectable by, 
nor can it cause injury to, humans. A common misconception is that iris 
recognition shines a laser on the eye to “scan” it. This is incorrect and untrue. Iris 
recognition simply takes an illuminated picture of the iris without causing any 
discomfort to the individual (National Science and Technology Council, n.d. 
p.81). The complex iris texture carries very distinctive information useful for 
personal recognition. The accuracy and speed of currently deployed iris-based 
recognition systems is promising and support the feasibility of large-scale 
identification systems based on iris information. Each iris is distinctive and even 
the irises of identical twins are different. It is possible to detect contact lenses 
printed with a fake iris. The hippus movement of the eye may also be used as a 
measure of liveness for this biometric. Although early iris-based recognition 
systems required considerable user participation and were expensive, the newer 
systems have become more user-friendly and cost-effective (Ross, Nandakumar 
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and Jain, 2006, p.23). Iris recognition is the best breed authentication process 
available today. Iris recognition takes a picture of the iris; this picture is used 
solely for authentication it is different from retinal scanning. Automated high 
speed iris capturing and precision identification make iris identification systems 
the world’s most advanced access and entry point security identification system 
(Patel, Trivedi and Patel, 2012, p. 4). The reason it is preferred is the iris has a 
unique pattern hitch that is formed by ten months of age and remains unchanged 
throughout one’s lifetime. It is impossible for two irises to produce the same 
code. Iris recognition is non-contact and quick, and offers unmatched accuracy 
when compared to any other security alternative, from distances as far as 3” to 
10” and only takes about 2 seconds ((Patel, Trivedi and Patel, 2012, p. 5).  
Figure 15.   Illustration of Iris Scan from istockphoto.com 
4. Summary of Current Biometric Technologies (Modalities) 
In a review of the literature, research and interviews with policy makers 
and trying to discover what would best enhance security in the RBS Aviation 
Passenger-Screening Program, a consensus was reached that the best 
modalities to be utilized are face, fingerprint and iris. DNA is highly unique and 
impossible to replicate, but difficult to obtain and thus is not used. As can be 
seen by the research, each of these modalities has its limitations and no single 
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biometric can bring about the desired performance universally, but the usage of 
multiple modalities is very promising. This leads to the suggestion that using not 
just one single modality, but the combination of more than one would provide the 
best theoretical solution to enhance aviation security. 
E. ANALYSIS OF BIOMETRICALLY ENHANCED SECURITY SYSTEMS 
1. DHS’ United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology (U.S.-VISIT) program 
The Department of Homeland Security established the U.S. Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (U.S.-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, 
and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United 
States at air, sea and land ports of entry (POE). These data, including biometric 
identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch 
lists, verify visitors’ identities and record arrival and departure (Government 
Accountability Office, 2006, ). The United States has more than 300 official ports 
of entry where nearly a half billion crossing occur every year. The Department of 
State (DOS) considers more than 9 million visa applications annually. DHS 
processes nearly 50,000 requests for asylum annually and processes 
approximately 30,000 applications for immigration benefits every day (National 
Science and Technology Council, 2008, p.28). In 2003, the U.S.-VISIT was 
created as part of a continuum of security measures that begins overseas and 
continues through a visitor’s arrival in and departure from the United States. It 
incorporates eligibility determinations made by both the Departments of 
Homeland Security and State.   
The U.S.-VISIT program works by visitors applying for a visa overseas at 
the visa-issuing post where each visitor has his or her biographic and biometric 
information – 10-point digital finger scans and a digital photograph – captured by 
a State Department official. Then, upon a visitor’s arrival in the United States, 
U.S. CBP Officer uses an inkless digital finger scanner to electronically capture 
ten finger scans. The visitor is asked to put the left hand fingers and then the 
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right hand fingers on the scanner. The CBP Officer also takes a digital 
photograph of the visitor. The biographic and biometric data are used to match 
the visitor with the travel documents and is compared against watch lists. The 
CBP officer then proceeds with questions about the visitor’s stay and then either 
admits the visitor or conducts additional queries based on the verification results. 
These procedures are designed to reduce fraud, identity theft, and the risk that 
terrorists and criminals would enter the United States undetected 
(www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/usvisit.htm, 2012). Over the last 10 years, 
the U.S.-VISIT program has evolved into a biometric and biographic identity 
verification and watch list-matching service. The biometric information that is 
gathered is stored in DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification Database 
(IDENT) and is shared throughout the Homeland Security community.  
Analysis shows the U.S.-VISIT program provides biometric information 
and analysis services for the Department of Homeland Security agencies 
including, CBP, ICE, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard and the Department 
of State. Through the use of biometrics the program greatly enhances 
immigration and border management, law enforcement and intelligence 
communities ability to accurately identify people and determine if they pose a risk 
to the United States. The U.S.-VISIT program can rapidly identify and verify U.S. 
visitors’ identities to help verify the identities of legal and illegal individuals 
attempting to enter the United States. It has also been a great source for 
assisting the United States intelligence community with identifying KSTs and 
terrorist suspects (National Science and Technology Council, 2008, p.28–29). 
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Figure 16.   Illustration of U.S. Visit Biometric Data Capture from CBP, 2012 
2. TSA’s Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 
program 
Within the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security 
Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard manage the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC) program, which requires maritime workers to 
complete background checks and obtain a biometric identification card to gain 
unescorted access to secure areas of regulated maritime facilities (Government 
Accountability Office, 2011). TWIC was established by Congress in 2002 through 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and is administered by the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard. The 
TWIC is a tamper-resistant biometric card that will be issued to workers who 
require unescorted access to secure areas of ports, vessels, outer continental 
shelf facilities, and all credentialed merchant mariners. It is anticipated that more 
than one million workers (including longshoremen, truckers, port employees, and 
others) will be required to obtain a TWIC. The TWIC contains two biometric 
templates of a person’s fingerprint. These templates are stored on the card in a 
format that is enciphered using a card-specific TWIC privacy key. To confirm a 
cardholder’s identity and ensure it matches the stored biometrics, the data on the 
card are retrieved, deciphered, verified, and matched against a live finger. TWIC 
uses biometrics for two primary identification purposes: background screening 
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and verification. Background screening occurs prior to the issuance of a TWIC 
and encompasses an FBI criminal history records check and a check of DHS’ 
IDENT database. Post-issuance, biometrics may be used at access control 
points to ensure that the biometrics of the individual attempting to use the TWIC 
match those stored within the credential (National Science and Technology 
Council, 2008, pp.33–34). 
Analysis of the TWIC program shows that a TWIC is required for all 
unescorted access to individuals such as longshoremen, port operator 
employees, truck drivers and rail worker which allows them access to secure 
areas of port facilities, rail yards and vessels regulated under the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act. TWIC is a biometric identification card with a 
customized computer chip containing a biometric identifier of a ten-finger 
fingerprint, a 2D digital photograph template, biographic information, and digital 
certificates. This biographical data is utilized to authenticate a worker’s 
immigration and work authorization status. Background checks are conducted 
including a review of criminal history records, terrorist watch lists, immigration 
status and outstanding warrants on the individual prior to being issued. 
Figure 17.   Illustration of TWIC Smart Card from TSA, 2012 
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3. CBP’s Global Entry (GE) program  
Global Entry is a program managed by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) that allows pre-approved, low-risk travelers expedited 
clearance upon arrival into the United States. The Global Entry program is the 
U.S. government’s expedited border crossing program for individuals in the 
United States that are predetermined to be low risk, returning from international 
destinations. Upon returning from international travel, Global Entry-enrolled 
travelers may bypass the regular passport control line and proceed directly to the 
Global Entry kiosk. The Global Entry process will require participants to present 
their machine-readable U.S. passport, Global Entry card, or permanent residency 
card, submit their ten-point fingerprints, have a digital photo taken for biometric 
verification, and make a customs declaration at the kiosk’s touch screen. The 
kiosk will compare the fingerprints presented to the fingerprints on file as well as 
compare the digital photo taken to the digital photo on file to confirm the 
traveler’s identity. Upon successful completion of the Global Entry process at the 
kiosk, the traveler will be issued a transaction receipt and directed to baggage 
claim and the exit unless chosen for a selective or random secondary referral 
(National Science and Technology Council, 2008, p.36).  
U.S. CBP officials and law enforcement agencies issue Global Entry cards 
to low risk travelers whose personal data has been subject to numerous 
background and security checks. Global Entry is open to U.S. citizens, lawful 
permanent residents, Dutch citizens, and Mexican nationals. Canadian citizens 
and residents may enjoy Global Entry benefits through membership in the 
NEXUS or SENTRI programs. U.S. Customs and Border Protection and law 
enforcement agencies run checks to determine if the individual has a criminal or 
immigration violation against him/her. These checks are repeated every time the 
traveler uses his/her Global Entry card. Any traveler with a criminal record or 
immigration violation will be automatically denied enrollment into the program. 
Recently, TSA has partnered with U.S. Customs and Border Protection as well 
as U.S. air carriers to incorporate a TSA program, TSA Pre✓™ that expedites 
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screening. TSA Pre✓™ utilizes the Global Entry program (including SENTRI and 
NEXUS) to determine eligibility for their expedited screening program. 
Analysis of the Global Entry program shows that international entry into 
the United States is leveraging biometrics to expedite customs and immigration 
processes while adding increased scrutiny and security within the systems and 
protocols. Biometrics have automated entry into the United States, while verifying 
identities of individuals entering and has expedited the screening and traveling 
process. The TSA does not biometrically verify the individual’s identity when 
utilizing the less scrutinized TSA Pre✓™ expedited screening lanes. There is 
only a verification of the traveler’s elite status as a frequent traveler or 
possession of a Global Entry (SENTRI or NEXUS) card and no automated 
biometric check is performed.  
Figure 18.   Illustration of Global Entry Kiosk from CBP, 2012 
4. Summary of Biometrically Enhanced Security Systems 
Examination of the U.S. government biometrically enhanced security 
programs shows they have made tremendous strides in utilizing biometrics to 
identify and verify individuals’ identity. These programs are focused on 
international passengers and international travel and provide identity verification 
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through fingerprints and facial recognition to allow entry into the United States by 
land, sea or air. A fundamental shortcoming of these programs is they have been 
designed individually and separately from each other and are proprietary to that 
particular program. They have recently begun sharing databases, but there has 
been no universality or standardization amongst the programs to gain synergy 
utilizing these biometrically enhanced programs. Analysis begs the question of 
why hasn’t biometrically enhanced security been used for domestic travel? The 
next chapter leads into how to integrate biometrics into the domestic RBS 
Aviation Passenger-Screening Program.  
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION  
A. FINDINGS 
The central idea of this thesis is how to incorporate biometric technology / 
programs into the Risk-Based Security Aviation Passenger-Screening Program. 
The integration and synthesis of biometric technology into the domestic 
screening process would validate the passenger’s identity, further increasing the 
security effectiveness and reliability of the passenger’s identity. One of the 
fundamental issues that has arisen is passengers who have been classified as 
low risk and authorized to use the TSA Pre✓™ checkpoints have not had a 
thorough background check and do not meet all the requirements to utilize the 
lane. For example, a requirement to use TSA Pre✓™ is the traveler must be a 
U.S. Citizen with a clear police investigation background check, yet we are 
finding foreign nationals being granted access to these TSA Pre✓™ lanes. The 
reason being is the airline industry has given us our initial low-risk population 
through its high time frequent flyer members program. The vetting of these 
individuals has been less than ideal creating a larger security gap than previously 
existed. 
1. RBS Initiative Programs Findings 
 Through research and analysis it was discovered that there is no 
standardization processes for the risk-based security initiatives for the Aviation 
Passenger Screening Program. In the analysis it was discovered there were no 
standardized enrollment processes to be considered for the pre-check program, 
KCM program or DoD CAC program. For enrollment into TSA Pre✓™, 
passengers could come from multiple areas: a member of the Global Entry 
program including SENTRI and Nexus; being a high time frequent flyer for one of 
the participating airlines; or possessing a DoD CAC for entry into the program. 
The enrollment process for becoming a member of Global Entry, for example, is 
one must go through a full background check, have biometric templates created 
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of both a 2D digital facial image and a ten-point fingerprint taken and stored in 
the DHS IDENT database, opt in voluntarily, and pay a fee. Additionally, the 
traveler is issued a biometric card that contains his/her 2D digital facial image, 
fingerprints and biographical data (note; biometric data and biographical data 
stored is not utilized for the verification of identity). In comparison, participating 
airlines nominate pre-check candidates from amongst their best customers and 
high time flyers who voluntarily opt in to receive the same privileges with no 
background check or surrendering of biometrics. Furthermore, it was discovered 
any Armed Forces service-members on active duty status or even currently 
discharged who still possess their DoD CAC card are eligible to enter into the 
TSA Pre✓™ lanes for reduced procedures and expedited passenger   screening  
(note: biometric data and biographical data stored on the card is not utilized for 
verification of identity). 
That   KCM program that offers pilots and flight attendants to bypass all 
security screening procedures only uses personal documentation identity 
comparison. The pilot or flight attendant produces his/her airline credentials, 
which are then visually verified against a computer query of the airlines database 
(note; no biographical data or biometric data is stored on their credentials only a 
visual comparison is done). KCM is set up for fingerprint biometrics, but they are 
not utilized for identity verification. Additionally, the control and data entry into the 
database is controlled by the individual airlines. This creates a possible security 
vulnerability within the security system since the airlines are not part of the TSA 
and there are several databases that need to be queried (each airline has their 
own) leading to more access points for vulnerabilities within the system. With one 
database under the control of the TSA the risk and vulnerability would be 
reduced for the system and it would then become more efficient (Ryan, 2010, 
pp.1–4). 
2. Current Biometric Technologies (modalities) Findings 
This research found that each individual technology has limitation in 
universality, uniqueness, permanence, collectability, or performance, 
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acceptability, and/or circumvention. Due to these limitations, no single biometric 
can provide a desired performance and the usage of multimodal biometric traits 
is promising. Exploiting information from multiple biometric sources or features 
improves the performance and also robustness of person authentication 
(verification and/or authentication) (Hossain and Chetty, 2011, p.142). In analysis 
it was found the best biometric modalities to be utilized for authentication are 
facial, fingerprint and iris. 
Facial recognition is among the different modalities used in biometrics, the 
face is considered to be the most transparent one. IT requires minimum 
cooperation from the subject. In some application scenarios, like crowd 
surveillance, face recognition probably is the only feasible modality to use. Face 
recognition is also the natural way used by human being in daily life (Li and 
Barreto, n.d. p.1). Facial recognition is one of the most acceptable, non-intrusive 
physiological attributes used to authenticate individuals. For face recognition, the 
performance of a 2D face matching systems depends on capability of being 
insensitive of critical factors such as facial expression, makeup and aging, but 
also relies upon extrinsic factors such as illumination difference camera 
viewpoint, and scene geometry (Hossain and Chetty, 2011, p. 142). Furthermore, 
even though 2D facial recognition has achieved considerable success, certain 
problems still exist because the 2D face images used not only depend on the 
face of a subject, but also depend on the imaging factors such as the 
environmental illumination and the orientation of the subject (Li and Barreto, n.d. 
p.1). The most promising right now is 3D facial recognition. There have been 
great developments in 3D imaging technology and facial recognition making it the 
better alternative in the field of biometrics. Unlike facial recognition using 2D 
images, 3D facial images capture the exact geometry of a person and it is 
invariant to illumination, environment and orientation of the person being 
authenticated. 
Fingerprints are the most widely used system for authentication. The FBI 
has been using it for over a century and the current IAFIS system has over 70 
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million criminal fingerprints and 34 million civilian fingerprints in it. The accuracy 
of the currently available fingerprint recognition systems is adequate for 
verification systems and small-to-medium-scale identification systems involving a 
few hundred users. Multiple fingerprints of a person provide additional 
information to allow for large-scale recognition involving millions of identities. One 
problem with the current fingerprint recognition systems is that they require a 
large amount of computational resources, especially when operating in the 
identification mode. Finally, fingerprints of a small fraction of the population may 
be unsuitable for automatic identification because of genetic factors aging, 
environmental, or occupational reasons (e.g., manual workers may have a larger 
number of cuts and bruises on their fingerprints that keep changing) (Jain, Ross 
and Prabhakar, 2004, p.9).  
 
Iris recognition appears to be the best type of authentication process 
available today. Iris recognition is the most prominent biometric capture 
technique that can be implemented. To capture an image of the iris is very 
simple. Iris recognition takes a picture of the iris; this picture is used solely for 
authentication and is different from retinal scanning. An iris security system is a 
smoother, smarter and more secure identification system. Automated high-speed 
iris capturing and precision identification make an iris identification system the 
world’s most advanced access and entry point security identification system. 
Using iris recognition technology has reduced errors to less that one in 1.2 million 
ensuring highly precise individual identification. Confusion or duplication with 
another individual is virtually impossible. No physical contact makes it perfectly 
safe. The individual merely needs to stand in front of the camera and a very 
weak amount of infrared illumination is used to capture the image. 
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Iris recognition is preferred because it is: Stable; the iris in humans has a 
unique pattern hitch and is formed by 10 months of age and remains unchanged 
throughout one’s lifetime. Unique; it is impossible for two irises to produce the 
same template. Flexible; Iris recognition technology can be easily integrated into 
existing security systems. Reliable; Iris pattern is unique and not susceptible to 
theft, loss or compromise. Non-invasive; Iris recognition is quick, non-contact and 
offers unmatched accuracy when compared to any other security alternative from 
distances as far as 3” to 10” unlike retinal scanning (Patel, Trivedi and Patel, 
2012, pp.4–5).   
Figure 19.   Advantages of Biometric traits from Le, 2011 
3. Biometrically Enhanced Security Systems Findings  
In analysis of DHS’ United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology (U.S.-VISIT) program, it was found the program processes and 
maintains biographic and biometric information collected by other federal entities 
such as the State Department and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
U.S.-VISIT also shares information on the entry and departure of foreign visitors 
who pass through U.S. ports of entry. U.S.-VISIT processes biometric information 
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such as fingerprints and photographs that, along with other biographic and 
biometric information that it shares with other Federal entities,, can be used to 
verify foreign nationals’ identities, authenticate travel documents, and determine 
the admissibility of visitors, immigrants and refugees (Office of Inspector General, 
2012, p.2). The data collected is stored in IDENT. The U.S.-VISIT program 
checks the person’s biometrics against a biometric watch list of more than 6.4 
million known or suspected terrorists, criminals, and immigration violators 
identified by U.S. authorities and Interpol. When a foreign visitor presents an 
identification document, U.S.-VISIT can check the person’s biometrics against 
other files that could be accessed to ensure that the document belongs to the 
person presenting it and not someone else (Office of Inspector General, 2012 
p.3). More importantly, U.S.-VISIT functions both as an identification system and 
a verification system. In the case of identification, U.S.-VISIT serves as a 
negative identification system by utilizing watch list information, such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal Master File, to identify individuals who 
should be denied entry into the United States and possibly apprehended or 
detained by law enforcement officials (GAO, 2008, p.55). In the case of 
verification, U.S.-VISIT is used to verify the identities of travelers who have been 
enrolled in the system. The program utilizes verification of individuals against 
databases such as the DHS IDENT and FBI IAFIS databases and [hopefully] in 
the future, DoD’s ABIS (Biometrics Task Force, 2010, pp.1–2). The U.S.-VISIT 
program has also faced its challenges by having fraudulent biographic identities. 
In a recent inspection, 825,000 incidents were found where the same fingerprints 
were associated with different biographic data. Additionally, the program has 
struggled to deliver the exit portion of the program in the United States thereby 
not having a biometrically based capability for knowing the status of the foreign 
nationals who have entered our country.  
In analysis of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 
program, it was found that the program was designed to create a common 
credential for transportation workers across the United States who required 
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unescorted access to secure areas at the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA) regulated maritime facilities and vessels. The TSA and USCG oversee 
this program jointly. The goal of the program is to positively verify the 
identification of authorized individuals (low-risk) access to secure areas of our 
nation’s transportation system. Each individual had to go through a thorough 
security and background check to assess their level of security risk; low-risk, 
unknown risk and high-risk. Additionally, the individuals had to enter the program 
voluntarily and submit biometric data including fingerprints and digital photo. 
Their biographical and biometric data is then utilized for a background check 
against local and federal sources and is stored in the FBI’s IAFIS database. 
Furthermore, their information is checked against federal terrorism information 
from the terrorist screening database including the selectee and no-fly list (GAO, 
2011, pp.9–11). Upon successful background check a TWIC card is issued which 
is a smart card with a small integrated circuit chip that can be read by inserting it 
into a card slot in a “contact” card reader or holding within 10 centimeters of a 
“contactless” card reader. It also has a magnetic strip and a linear bar code. The 
card contains biometric data and biographical information. The card is valid for 
five years at an initial enrollment fee of $129.75. As of March 2012, the TWIC 
program has enrolled 2.1 million maritime workers and has issued almost 2 
million credentials. The program has improved maritime security by using a 
federally issued and sponsored credential to enhance access control to secure 
areas at MTSA regulated facilities, vessels, and areas of our nation’s 
transportation system. The program has not been without challenges, however. 
In a recent GAO report, it pointed to a lack of standardization in the enrollment 
process, which included an inability to provide reasonable assurance that only 
qualified individuals were enrolled. The system does not have a constant 
feedback loop to continually check the eligibility of TWIC cardholders. After 
enrollment the national databases are not checked again. This does not allow for 
verifying that a TWIC cardholder may have become ineligible after receiving 
his/her TWIC (GAO, 2012, pp.12–13). 
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In the analysis of the Global Entry program it was found that the Global 
Entry program in 2012 became a permanent Customs and Border Protection 
program that allows low-risk, pre-approved travelers expedited access into the 
United States from foreign travel. The program requires a very thorough and 
rigorous background check and interview process. Furthermore, it is a voluntary 
program where biographical information and biometric data is provided and 
stored in the DHS IDENT database. Additionally, a smart card is issued 
containing the biographic and biometric data of the individual. The way the 
traveler enters into the United States is through a Global Entry kiosk in lieu of 
waiting in long lines for border and customs clearance. The traveler merely 
presents his/her passport, permanent resident card or Global Entry card, provide 
fingerprints and digital photo for identity verification against the credential 
provided and then makes a customs declaration. If all the requirements of identity 
verification are met, a receipt is printed and the traveler proceeds to the exit. 
Note, they may be randomly selected for further examination or inspection at any 
time. As of mid-2012, there are kiosks in over 25 major airports across the United 
States that have been used over 6 million times, reducing traveler wait times by 
70 percent and saving CBP officers more than 50,000 inspection hours, allowing 
them to focus resources on individuals of unknown or high-risk status 
(Zuckerman, 2012, pp.1–2). 
In summary of these findings, the U.S.-VISIT program utilizes biometrics 
and biographical data and verifies them against national databases (IDENT, 
IAFIS and ABIS) to verify identity and threat assessment against the United 
States. The TSA/USCG TWIC program uses biographic and biometric data along 
with smart card technology to verify identity and allow individuals into the secure 
areas of our transportation system. The novel Global Entry program uses 
biographic and biometric data along with kiosks to expedite customs and 
immigration entry into the United States while verifying identity and threat 
assessment. This program also reduces resources and assets needed while 
increasing efficiency of customs clearance. 
 85 
4. International Biometric Programs-Automated Border 
Clearance (ABC) 
Since 1997, the international community has continually embraced and 
improved upon using biometrics to expedite passenger travel while reducing 
security resources and increasing security efficiency through the use of 
biometrics. A majority of Europe has adopted ABC systems to handle medium to 
high inbound or outbound traffic. ABC systems enable eligible and cleared 
passengers to gain permission to access Europe’s national transportation 
system, which includes crossing national or regional borders by simply 
interfacing with ABC kiosks and gates. The gates use biometrics such as 
fingerprints or facial images to confirm the identity of the traveler while 
performing background checks simultaneously. These automatic biometric 
systems allow a way to expedite large volumes of travelers without the need for 
additional staffing and increase the efficiency and security of the entire national 
transportation system (Accenture, 2010). Many of these programs are single 
modal programs and have recently transitioned to multi-modal systems for travel, 
entry and border clearance. Some of the programs that have been successful 
are: 
SmartGate Australia; an automated border clearance and processing 
program that allows eligible travelers with electronic passports to self-process 
through passport control. SmartGate is a two-step process. The first step, at the 
kiosk, is where the electronic passport is read and a ticket issued to the 
passenger. Step two, the gate, the passenger inserts the ticket and biometric 
verification matches the passenger’s live photo with the reference image read 
from their electronic passport. SmartGate uses facial biometric technology. The 
reference image read from the electronic passport is biometrically compared with 
a live image of the passenger. An Australian survey found an 86 percent 
approval from the travelling public who found it easy to use and 99 percent would 
use it again (Frontex, 2010, pp.28–29). The system is said to cut the processing 
time from 45 to 17 seconds with a 98 percent success rate (Accenture, 2010). 
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Figure 20.   Photo of SmartGate (Facial and Fingerprint) Brisbane International 
Airport from Frontex, 2010 
The RAPID border control system was the first system to use biometrics in 
Europe. RAPID was first utilized in Portugal for border control for travelers using 
electronic passports and was a way for the government to control immigration 
and internal transportation security. The way it works is a photo of the passenger 
is taken at the automated gate and a live match is performed to the smart card or 
electronic passport with facial biometrics. After the identity is verified the 
automatic gate opens and the traveler is allowed to enter. Since 2007, RAPID 
has reduced the border control process to an average of less than 20 seconds 
per person resulting in processing 180 passengers per hour. An estimation of a 
reduction in human resources cost by approximately 55 percent has been 
forecast. 
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Figure 21.   Photo of RAPID gates (Facial Recognition) at Faro Airport Portugal 
from Frontex, 2010 
The Privium system in the Netherlands is a voluntary opt-in frequent flyer 
program for Europe. The program uses a smart card containing the traveler’s 
biometric information. The biometric data that is stored is the iris template. The 
travelers entering or exiting the Netherlands are fast tracked into a separate 
border control line where kiosks accept the Privium smart card. Iris cameras are 
used to verify the traveler’s identity against the smart card. This program has 
been highly successful in the Netherlands (Accenture, 2010). 
Figure 22.   Photo of Privium system in the Netherlands (Iris Scan) from Airport 
Business, 2009 
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The biometric e-Gate system, in the United Arab Emirates, has created a 
faster more efficient movement of passengers. It uses biographical data and 
biometric data. The new system quickly scans the electronic passport as well as 
acquires biometric data including facial and retinal scan. The system then 
matches the captures biometric information against databases and existing lists 
to detect potential threats. It is estimated that these new procedures are 
performed in 12–14 seconds while maintaining a high level of accuracy and 
security efficiency (The Gulf Today, 2012). 
Figure 23.   Photo of e-gate at Dubai Airport UAE (Facial and Retinal) from The 
Gulf Today, 2012 
In summary, since 1997 until today, biometrics have been embraced by 
our international allies as a way to verification and identification of travelers and 
citizens. The progress made has led to multi-modal biometric systems that are 
now incorporating more than just one biometric trait. Most recently, the United 
Kingdom now utilizes face, iris and fingerprints. Spain now uses face and 
fingerprints. The Netherlands is now incorporating the face along with the iris and 
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Finland is incorporating the face with fingerprints as well. Biometrics has 
definitely come to the forefront for large scale identity authentication which in turn 
improves security, increases the flow of passengers and frees up human 
resources to be utilized elsewhere on higher risk passengers (Accenture, 2010). 
Figure 24.   Photo of new United Kingdom Border Control (Facial and 
Fingerprint) from ThirdFactor, 2012 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The Transportation Security Administration should integrate a 
biometrically enhanced security system into the current RBS Aviation Passenger-
Screening Program. Create a prototype of the ideal security checkpoint utilizing 
biometrics could be designed by collaborating with and integrating some of the 
best multi-modal biometric authentication systems available. In a review of the 
findings, biometrics incorporated into the current RBS initiative programs (TSA 
Pre✓™, DoD CAC and KCM) would be able to close security identity verification 
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gaps with passengers by simply adding a biometric system into the RBS APSP 
during the pre-check phase. The best way to incorporate this would be to have 
an automated biometric clearance station or kiosk at the front of all pre-check 
security lanes. The features of the biometric security station would include: 
 
• Biometric identity cards or biometric passports to validate a 
person’s identity prior to entering the TSA Pre✓™ line. The 
passenger enters with a biometric smart card, which would have 
the traveler’s biometric template for facial, fingerprint and iris. 
• While at the biometric security station, a picture is taken while 
simultaneously obtaining fingerprints and an iris scan. It would be a 
combination of a 2-dimentional biometric facial recognition along 
with an iris scan and failsafe five-finger fingerprint scan.   
• The biometrics obtained at the security station are then compared 
to the templates stored on the smart card. Thee biometric 
information gained at a kiosk would then be cross-referenced 
against the information stored on the biometric card or passport 
and also the national biometric databases to give certainty and 
validity to the person’s identity before they are allowed to enter. 
• During authentication, if the identity of the traveler is verified, 
he/she is allowed to enter the pre-check lane for expedited security 
screening. The information gathered would be sent to the Triad of 
biometric Databases (DoD’s ABIS, FBI’s IAFIS {NGI} and DHS 
IDENT), which would validate the identity and also search for any 
illicit activities or warrants tied to the traveler.   
• After expedited security screening the traveler then enters into the 
national transportation system. 
 
Besides being utilized for identity verification (1:1), it can also be used for 
identification authentication (1:n) if the biometric information gathered is sent to 
one of the national databases for verification. If the system can be integrated with 
the national databases, this would also become a powerful law enforcement tool. 
This would have the added benefit of assisting law enforcement agencies in 
identifying known suspects and people of interest. This would be an incremental 
innovation after being tested on our low-risk passengers, we could offer it to our 
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normal risk passengers on a volunteer basis, and eventually, offer it to high-risk 
passengers. 
Collaborating with Customs and Border Protection’s Global Entry program 
could yield extensive benefits by adopting the Global Entry program’s structure 
and system. This new TSA biometric program could utilize the already 
established CBP Global Entry network by making modifications to meet the 
needs of domestic travelers and entering into the national transportation system. 
The kiosk could be modified to include iris scanning. The TSA could issue a 
biometric smart card, much like the TWIC. All participants could voluntarily opt-in 
for expedited convenience with a fee to cover the maintenance fees and cost of 
the program. Additionally, the biometric records could be stored in a national 
database, preferably the FBI IAFIS and soon to be NGI. The control of all stored 
biometric data would be in control of the U.S. government instead of private 
corporations such as CLEAR which had fiscal difficulties and bankruptcy.  
Furthermore, the process for enrollment should be standardized to allow 
for consistent background checks and vetting of individuals unlike the programs 
now that allow high time frequent flyers to be eligible to enroll without background 
checks. The Global Entry program and the new TSA domestic travel program 
utilizing a standard card that is valid for both international as well as domestic 
entry into the national transportation system. This could create a significant cost 
savings and resource reduction for both the CBP and the TSA.  
Finally, this standardized system could be utilized for KCM. This would 
allow for a standard enrollment with background checks done by the U.S. 
Government. The KCM databases would then be integrated into the national 
databases and provide quality assurance over the identification of the pilots and 
flight attendants. Furthermore, it would incorporate and identity verification step 
at the security station or kiosk and eliminate manual matching done by the 
Transportation Security Officers. The system could be fully automated which 
would further eliminate costs and resources needed for entry into the national 
transportation system.  
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Figure 25.   Illustration of future checkpoint (Facial, Fingerprint and Iris) from  
Visio-Box, Copyright 2012 
 
Figure 26.   Photo of e-Passport gates at Terminal 4 in London’s Heathrow 
Airport (Facial, Fingerprint and Iris), from Accenture, 2012 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH 
1. Biometric Security Systems 
Biometric security systems are a new technology, but there are many 
applications and solutions for the use of biometric technology to exponentially 
enhance security systems. The main purpose of the biometric security system is 
to verify and identify a person’s identity. This biometric technology is the most 
convenient over other protection technologies of identity authentication. For 
example, driver’s licenses and ID cards that are used to authenticate a user’s 
identity. In the current RBS Aviation Passenger-Screening Program, an attempt 
is made to check the authenticity of the travel document presented ensuring that 
it is not fraudulent, instead of trying to authenticate a person’s identity we are not 
utilizing identification (1:n) or verification (1:1) processes to know who the person 
really is.  
There are many advantages to using biometric security systems. First and 
foremost is the uniqueness of biometric technology. Each individual’s 
identification will be the single most effective identification for that user. A chance 
of two users having the same identification in the biometric security technology 
system is nearly zero (Le, 2011). It is also extremely hard or impossible to make 
duplicate or shared biometric accessing data with other users and is less prone 
for users to share access to highly sensitive data since they have to use 
biometrics. This makes the system even more secure allowing user information 
and data to be kept highly secure from unauthorized users. Lastly, the 
identification of users cannot be lost, stolen or forgotten since it is the person’s 
biometric that allows them access to the system. Most biometric security systems 
are easy to install and have become fairly inexpensive. 
Some of the disadvantages of biometric security systems are each 
biometric modality has a weakness, which may cause some problems with the 
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interface with the biometric security system. For example, fingerprints could be 
problematic if the individual loses his/her fingers or does not have fingers at all. 
For iris or retinal scanning biometric systems, psychologically users find it very 
intrusive and have concern for the safety of their eyesight. Databases used to 
store user identification will be very large and require new and modern 
technology so initial startup may be expensive for the equipment required for the 
storage and security of the data (Le, 2012). 
2. Strategic Benefits 
The utilization of biometric stations or kiosks would verify the biometric 
identity (1:1) of passengers carrying smart cards or electronic passports, it could 
reduce the number Travel Document Checker’s (TDC) stations and the time 
required to validate passenger documentation. At the station or kiosk, the 
traveler’s identity would be validated and his/her airline gate pass would be 
endorsed to allow them into their proper security checkpoint, would be 
accomplished in one location. Furthermore, it could reduce the number of 
Transportation Security Officers required by eliminating the majority of the Travel 
Document Checker stations with this new station or kiosk while simultaneously 
increasing the scrutiny of the traveler, making for a better overall aviation 
passenger security screening process and lessening the risk for validation of 
identities. Reducing the number of TDC stations in turn reduces the number of 
human assets required and thus reduces budgetary costs. The efficiency and 
effectiveness of the checkpoints would increase because of reduced inspection 
requirements and the burden of removing shoes, jackets, laptops etc. Wait times 
would lessen because of the improved procedure and lines would decrease by 
validating trustworthy passengers who would need fewer inspections and 
scrutiny at security checkpoints since they are a low risk or threat to the aviation 
enterprise. This new approach greatly increases risk mitigation from the current 
approach we have today. In the future the biometric station or kiosk can be used 
for identification authentication (1:n). This new system would allow the ability to 
cross-reference numerous government databases with biometric data to 
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authenticate the identification of the traveling passenger presenting his/her 
biometrics. A secondary function would be to cross-reference any other illicit 
activities the traveler may be associated with such as outstanding warrants. The 
overall benefits would be increased security efficiency through verification or 
identification of traveling passengers. This would reduce the number of manning 
and budgetary requirements while increasing the speed of processing and 
reducing the wait times as well as increasing the capacity of the screening lanes, 
which improves the entire traveling experience. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
1. Oppositional Agendas to the Incorporation of Biometrics 
The main opposition to the incorporation of biometrics into the Aviation 
Passenger-Screening Program would be civil liberties groups, union and 
personal privacy and trust issues. The main opposition to biometrics and the 
gathering of biometrics is that it is a violation of our civil liberties. The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has been the largest voice on this. It contends that 
after the biometric information has been collected and stored in one of the Triad 
databases, specifically the FBI’s Next Generation Identification (NGI), the FBI 
would then tie-in computers to this biometric database and link them to 
surveillance cameras throughout the United States. They fear it would be a step 
toward mass surveillance of the population, which poses a “grave danger” to 
American values. They suggest it is more than just invasive; it is a fundamental 
revolution of American values. Additionally, there are many conspiracy theorists 
who prescribe to the Orwellian 1984 theory that “Big Brother is watching you” or 
Aldous Huxley’s “Brave New World” where genetics and biometrics are utilized to 
determine one’s class in life. Another opponent that may arise by incorporating 
biometrics is the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). They 
could arbitrate to not have biometric kiosks installed because it might eliminate 
government positions. This would decrease the U.S. Government’s largest 
unionized workforce. The AFGE would want to maintain the status quo or grow to 
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improve their political power and lobbying efforts. Furthermore, there are 
personal privacy issues such as the right to be left alone. Privacy is generally 
viewed as a selective disclosure of personal information founded on the 
equilibrium between one’s private life and his/her accepted social identity. One of 
the first major challenges with privacy is that biometrics are not like a password 
or token that can be revoked once they have been presented. Individuals are 
concerned that by using biometrics systems, they leave behind a trail of 
information that is very personal in nature and can reveal very personal 
information about them such as retinal scans can reveal images regarding 
certain medical conditions. Another privacy challenge for biometrics systems is 
the user’s inability to control the collection and uses of the biometric information. 
This presents an important question for travelers; do travelers need to provide 
consent before biometric information is collected and utilized and can this 
biometric information be sold to third parties for marketing purposes. In order to 
establish privacy for the biometric system, information collected must only be 
used for the purpose for which it was collected. The information must be stored 
on a device owned by the user, smart card or biometric passport. The individual 
must be educated on the rights of the biometric system user. This shows the 
traveler’s sense of privacy influences the adoption of biometric systems for travel. 
The last challenge is trust. The traveler must trust in the organization to whom 
he/she is providing biometric information. Travelers’ sense of trust associated 
with biometric systems greatly influences the adoption of the biometric system 
and travel (Morosan, 2012, pp.187–188).  
2. Allies and Agendas 
There are far more allies than opponents in the biometric incremental 
innovation to change this complex adaptive system. As stated earlier, the TSA is 
looking for efficiency and speed at the checkpoints, which leads to more revenue 
and a better travel experience. Some of these allies and agendas are the Air Line 
Pilot’s Association, International (ALPA), Airlines for America (A4A) and the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) as well as, all the commercial 
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airlines. These organizations want to reduce requirements of the screening 
process while increasing the throughput and speed of the Aviation Passenger-
Screening checkpoints. The agenda is, the more efficient and faster a checkpoint 
is, the more flights they can book and the more revenue that is generated. The 
airline associations’ agenda is clear; profit. The TSA has assisted with this by 
standing up Known Crew Member (KCM). To illustrate, the ALPA and A4A in 
conjunction with the TSA, entered into a joint, collaborative checkpoint security 
procedure with airline pilots. The way the KCM program works is, the airline pilot, 
with his credentials, enters a special checkpoint that has no walk through metal 
detector or X-ray machine, just a biometrically enhanced card and fingerprint 
reader attached to a computer. After presenting credentials, the computer then 
validates the credentials against a database and allows the airline pilot and crew 
to pass without having to endure any of the screening processes. This process 
only takes a matter of seconds versus minutes, which further reduces the 
congestion at the other checkpoints. All these organizations endorse this 
program because it maximizes the crew duty day by reducing the amount of time 
spent at checkpoint screening. It has been estimated that 30 minutes to an hour 
out of their duty day has been gained by not standing in screening checkpoint 
lines. Yet another agenda might come from the large scale specialized 
manufacturers of screening equipment such as L3 and Rapid Scan. Utilization of 
biometrics would improve the efficiency of checkpoints without the necessity of 
current technologically enhanced screening equipment, thus reducing walk-
through metal detectors, X-ray machines and Advanced Imaging Technology 
(body scanners) sold and utilized by the U.S. government throughout the 460 
federalized airports. Lastly, the more clandestine agendas would be the FBI 
wanting access to the current, live streaming biometric data presented at the 
checkpoints. They would want to track people of interest and Known Suspected 
Terrorists (KST). This would allow them to easily locate suspects quickly and 
covertly. Many agendas would be served or disadvantaged with the incorporation 
of biometrics depending on the organization. 
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3. Wild Cards 
The budgetary cost of the TSA to the U.S. taxpayer has been ballooning 
at a time when we are looking for ways to be more fiscally responsible. At the 
same time, air travel has been expanding. The TSA’s budget from 2004–2010, 
increased by over 68% while the number of air travelers remained relatively the 
same. In the near future our fiscal constraints and government cutbacks may 
require a large reduction in the federalized workforce or force the return to 
commercialization of aviation passenger screening, much like the model at San 
Francisco International Airport where passenger screening is done by 
contractors. If U.S. budgetary constraints on the horizon are what they are 
expected to be, the TSA could cease to exist as an agency and our 
technologically enhanced security measures including biometric identity 
validation could also cease to exist based on lack of available funding. 
In 2010, there were 263 million air travelers in the United States. The FAA 
predicts that by 2021 that number will increase to 1 billion U.S. air travelers per 
year. Another possible wild card would be that air travel becomes too costly for 
the upper middle class or below to travel. The airline industry revenues would 
then constrict and there would no longer be a requirement for screening that is 
done today. Airline travel would only be available to the very wealthy and/or 
private aircraft owners. If the airline industry as we know it collapsed, there would 
be no requirement for the screening we have today. 
After 9/11, the Aviation Passenger-Screening Program was initially a 
disruptive innovation. The entire screening process was upended and revamped, 
involving federalizing the work force to include 60,000 Transportation Security 
Officers (TSO’s). Technology was introduced to detect prohibited items (i.e., 
knives, guns, etc.) along with introducing government regulations to control and 
standardize aviation passenger screening checkpoints. This was a fundamental 
departure from the way passenger screening had been done in the past when 
the airlines controlled the screening process. There was no standardization and 
very little security value. Since 2002, we have been on an incremental innovation 
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approach to passenger screening. With every threat that has occurred, we have 
introduced technology to overcome the issue. For example, the 2009 underwear 
bomber led us to introduce the new Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), 
otherwise known as the body scanner. All this accomplished was adding billions 
of dollars to screening and increasing the number of screening requirements and 
inspections done to passengers which in turn led to longer lines and longer wait 
times at checkpoints.  
The Aviation Passenger-Screening Program has continued to be an 
adaptive system since its inception, but it has been unsuccessful in adapting 
properly to the environment in which it was designed to benefit; the airline 
industry. It has almost had the opposite effect and become a burden by driving 
up costs, increasing wait times, slowing passenger flow and increasing the 
hassle of air travel which lessens the number of flights people take. In reality, this 
has not increased security significantly but has given the appearance that it has. 
We have mastered finding prohibited objects going on airplanes; however, we 
are still quite naïve when it comes to finding bad people, with ill intent, who wish 
to do us harm and preventing them from boarding planes.   
In late 2011, the Transportation Security Administration introduced 
changes to this complex adaptive system; called Risk Based Security (RBS) 
initiatives. RBS is a process that classifies passengers into different risk 
categories based on information gained during a pre-screening passenger risk 
assessment. This risk assessment then aligns security protocols to their pre-
screening risk assessment. Now we have what is called the TSA Pre✓™ 
checkpoint where passengers who have received a low-risk pre-screening are 
allowed to go to the TSA Pre✓™ checkpoint, keep their shoes and jacket on, as 
well as, keep their liquids and laptops in their bags. This has greatly increased 
the efficiency and speed of the checkpoint while reducing wait times and 
passenger travel hassles.  
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis is very narrowly crafted to just review the current biometric 
modalities that are out there to current biometrically enhanced security programs 
that can be utilized to improve our current Risk-Based Security Aviation 
Passenger Security Program. The goal was to help create an ideal model where 
biometrics could be utilized to enhance risk based security using biometrics. Due 
to the limitations and scope of this thesis, these final results could not be all 
inclusive or a totally encompassing solution to improve Aviation Passenger 
Screening. There are other areas of research. 
1. 3D Facial Recognition 
Future research can be looked at utilizing 3D facial recognition in place of 
the 2D facial recognition currently being used. In lieu of using 2D recognition, 3D 
facial recognition greatly enhances the efficiency and accuracy of using facial 
recognition as biometric identification and verification method. 3D facial 
recognition holds great promise. 3D modeling enhances recognition performance 
because it can be used to recognize people in profile versus a typical forward-
looking “mug shot” pose. This could lead to scanning people while waiting in 
security checkpoint lanes for screening. They could even walk through the 
cordoned area where they could be recognized and allowed to go directly to RBS 
APSP. Research would have to be conducted to determine how 3D facial 
recognition could be integrated. 
2. TSA Biometric Data Sharing and Integration With Other 
Federal Agencies 
Future research can be done on the collection of biometric data through 
the TSA’s biometrically enhanced checkpoint. These biometric stations/kiosks 
could be utilized by integrating the world’s two largest biometric databases, the 
FBI’s IAFIS and DHS’ IDENT. Each database holds over a hundred million 
records. If the databases could be integrated for interoperability and data sharing 
we could have a very powerful biometric database for identification (1:n) and 
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verification (1:1). A study would have to be conducted to research how the 
databases could be integrated into the RBS APSP.  
3. Biometrics and Privacy Concerns 
For many years now the public has had concerns about the gathering of 
biometrics; more specifically, gathering biometrics for facial recognition. If this 
new system could gather 2D or 3D photos to identify a person in a public place, 
one would no longer have anonymity in a public place. A simple comparison of a 
photo of an individual to one of the biometric databases would reveal the identity 
and biometric data of that individual. This in turn raises the privacy concern some 
individuals may have. The privacy concern may be the most troublesome issue 
that will have to be addressed. Is the public willing to sacrifice some of their 
liberty for the sake of their safety and security?  As Benjamin Franklin stated, 
“They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve 
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